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I. INTRODUCTION
According to her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit, a female seventh grade special
education student in Republic, Missouri, was forced by school officials to
personally apologize to the male student who had raped her on school grounds.2
School officials did not believe the child when she reported the on-campus rape
and multiple sexual assaults to them.3 After being instructed to write the
apology, the female student was also suspended.4 Upon her return to school, she
was suspended again for disrespectful conduct and public display of affection
after she accused the boy of raping her a second time.5 A subsequent medical
examination confirmed the veracity of the girl's claims.6 The forced apology by
the school was a shaming punishment that further victimized this young girl.7
According to another § 1983 lawsuit, Jane Doe, a high school student in
Harrisville, New York, was escorted to the principal's office upon her arrival at
school, where the superintendent and elementary school principal were present
and where she was informed that other students had accused her of drug
possession.8 Subsequently, Jane was escorted to the nurse's office for a strip
search, in which she was forced to remove all of her clothing and stand naked
while the elementary school principal and nurse searched them. 9 No drugs or
contraband were found during this search.10 Subsequently, the nurse, in the
presence of the elementary school principal, conducted a visual rectal and
vaginal search for drugs, during which the nurse laughed and stated, "[T]his is
2 Alex Sundby, Lawsuit: Mo. Girl Expelledfor Making Rape Claim, CBS NEws (Aug.
17, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lawsuit-mo-girl-expelled-for-making-rape-claim
[https://perma.cc/F3LS-3KTD] (discussing the lawsuit's claims).
3 Id
4 Alyssa Newcomb, Special Needs Girl Sues School for Forcing Her To Apologize to
Her Rapist, ABC NEws (Aug. 17, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/special-student-sues-
missouri-school-district-rapes/story?id=14325659 [https://perma.cc/FN8T-ST9D].
5Id (discussing the lawsuit's allegations).
6 CNN Wire Staff, Lawsuit Alleges Missouri School Expelled Girl for Making Rape
Claim, CNN (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/201I/CRIMIE/08/18/missouri.school.rape.
claim/ [https//permacc/EP4V-5QWX].
7 See Ugo Uche, School Forces Little Girl To Apologize to the Boy Who Raped Her,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug. 22, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/promoting-
empathy-your-teen/201108/school-forces-little-girl-apologize-the-boy-who-raped-her
[https://perma.cc/2DMB-5A5M] (discussing the forced apology's compounding effect in
harming the student).
8 Complaint at 3-4, Doe v. Finster, No. 7:16-cv-1467 (FJS/ATB) (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8,
2016). The allegations of this complaint are provided throughout this text paragraph.
9 Id at 4-5.
10Id at 5.
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a first .. . ." 1 Again, no contraband was found. 12 After one hour and twenty
minutes of this "shameful treatment and embarrassment," Jane's clothing was
returned and she was permitted to dress. 13 Jane's request to call her father was
summarily denied.1 4 According to Jane, the strip search was "frightening,
degrading, and de-humanizing,"' 5 and it resulted in severe mental anguish and
"permanent loss of natural psychological development."l 6
Across the country, K-12 schools, teachers, and administrators are inflicting
shaming punishments upon students for noncompliance or suspicion of
noncompliance with school or classroom rules.17 These in-school shaming
sanctions are designed to punish behavior by making an example of the targeted
student in front of his or her peers, teachers, administrators, or the broader
school community. 18 Rather than removing the child from school grounds or
imposing physical pain upon the child, these shaming punishments shine a
bright spotlight upon the offending student and his or her conduct' 9 while
keeping the student within the schoolhouse gate. School shaming punishments
fall into a myriad of categories, which include publicly displayed personal
behavior systems, 20 forced isolation, 21 compelled apologies, 22 invasive
searches, 23 and scarlet letter punishments for dress code violations. 24 Although
the shaming punishments that are being implemented in American schools are
11 Id. at 6-7.
12Id
13 1d at 7.
14 See Complaint, supra note 8, at 7.15 1d. at 8.
16 d
17 See, e.g., Ann Monroe, Shame Solutions: How Shame Impacts School-Aged Children
and What Teachers Can Do To Help, 73 EDUC. F. 58, 66 (2009) (stating schools "all too
often . .. perpetuate the cycle of shame").
18See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 21-22 (2015)
("Shaming penalties have historically been employed to reaffirm class relationships and
reinforce the shamed person's subordinate status.").
19 Cf Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147,
176 (2000) (discussing how shaming sanctions focus concentrated negative community
attention on the alleged rule violator).
2 0 JUNE PRICE TANGNEY & RONDA L. DEARING, SHAME AND GUILT 188 (2002)
(classifying writing schoolchildren's names on the classroom chalkboard as a shaming
punishment).
21 Id (classifying the placement of students in a corner or a separate area from their
peers as a shaming punishment).
22 Brent T. White, Say You're Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights
Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1286-87 (2006) (characterizing compelled apologies as
shaming sanctions).
23 See Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power ofPriming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science
ofFirst Impressions To Persuade the Reader, 89 OR. L. REV. 305, 327 (2010) (describing a
student's deep-seated humiliation when forced to undergo a strip search).
24Meredith Johnson Harbach, Sexualization, Sex Discrimination, and Public School
Dress Codes, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1043-44 (2016) (characterizing dress code violation
enforcements as shaming punishments).
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diverse, their common denominator is the goal to attach stigma to the student
who has allegedly violated the rules by engaging in state-deemed shameful
behavior.25
While there has been a significant amount of legal scholarship dedicated to
the clearly detrimental effects of exclusionary punishment26 and corporal
punishment,27 there has been almost no critical analysis of shaming punishments
in schools. The aim of this Article is to fill this void by examining these
punishments' lack of efficacy, outlining their substantial harm, and advocating
for their cessation through a constitutional lens. Specifically, Part II of this
Article will provide definitional context to shaming punishments and their
inherent stigma by focusing on the work of sociologist Erving Goffman and
criminologist John Braithwaite. Thereafter, Part II will demonstrate that, like
exclusionary and corporal punishments, shaming punishments fail to meet any
type of efficacy metric, based on their nondeterrent, nonrehabilitative, and
nonreformative nature. Part II will then explore the damaging effects of shaming
punishments in schools, on both the disciplined students and the greater school
community, via an extended comparison between exclusionary punishments,
corporal punishments, and in-school shaming punishments.
Part M presents the normative rejection of shaming punishments based on
how they can result in violations of students' First and Fourth Amendment
rights, which might give rise to liability in individual and derivative 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 lawsuits. This Part will use paradigmatic case examples to illustrate how
the specific school shaming punishments of compelled apologies and strip
searches can exceed the constitutional limits of the considerable deference that
has been extended to schools and their employees by the courts in disciplinary
matters. Under a purely utilitarian perspective, schools and their employees
should no longer use shaming as a disciplinary measure in order to avoid the
2 5 E g., Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-
Income Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 297, 301 (2013) (defining shaming degradation
ceremonies as "communicative work 'whereby the public identity of an actor is transformed
into something looked on as lower in the local scheme of social types"' (quoting Harold
Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. Soc. 420, 420
(1956))).
2 6 See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit ofZero Tolerance in Schools, 99
MINN. L. REV. 823, 833 (2015) (describing suspension and expulsion "as de facto
educational death penalties [rather] than ... corrective or management tools"); S. David
Mitchell, Zero Tolerance Policies: Criminalizing Childhood and Disenfranchising the Next
Generation of Citizens, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 271, 291 (2014) (discussing the school-to-
prison pipeline as one harm of exclusionary school punishments).27 E.g., Susan H. Bitensky, The Poverty ofPrecedent for School Corporal Punishment's
Constitutionality Under the Eighth Amendment, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 1327, 1353 (2009)
(arguing school corporal punishments violate the Eighth Amendment); Deana Pollard Sacks,
State Actors Beating Children: A Callfor Judicial Relief, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1165, 1169
(2009) (describing corporal punishment's impact on children as "profound, dangerous, and
enduring").
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monetary and injunctive liability that can result from these lawsuits. 28 More
importantly, 29 though, schools and their employees should end their use of
shaming as a method of punishment to avoid violating the constitutional rights
of their students. 30
Finally, Part IV will conclude by advocating for the end of school shaming
punishments and by previewing more beneficial consequential alternatives to
address student conduct that can restore respect, rather than exacerbate stigma,
among all school community constituencies. By replacing shaming with
consequential methods for Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports, 31
schools can fulfill their obligation to provide an appropriate educational
environment, which will effectively serve to awaken children to cultural values
and to prepare them to be active, well-adjusted adults in society. 32 A liberal
democracy should require no less.33
II. THE INEFFICACY AND HARM OF SCHOOL SHAMING PUNISHMENTS
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court recognized that
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments," deeming it "the very foundation of good citizenship." 34
Education prepares students to be self-reliant, self-sufficient, active participants
2 8 See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,649 (1999)
(acknowledging "school administrators shoulder substantial burdens as a result of legal
constraints on their disciplinary authority" and discussing the importance of clear standards
for disciplinary authority to avoid "potential liability arising from certain forms of
disciplinary action").
29 See, e.g., Emmalena K. Quesada, Note, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare:
Peer Sexual Harassment and the Standard for School Liability Under Title IX, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1014, 1067 (1998) (discussing how avoidance of liability is not the best reason to
eliminate rights-violative conduct in schools).
30 See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995)
("[C]hildren assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse
gate. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969))); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (providing state
school entities and actors are not "beyond reach of the Constitution").
3 1Neelum Arya, Family-Driven Justice, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 623, 669 (2014) (arguing
PBIS can provide "positive school environments and cultures to improve the behavior of
students"). See generally Homepage, POSITIVE BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS & SUPPORTS
(PBIS), http://www.pbis.org [https://perma.cc/9KCE-BE3L] (stating the "purpose of PBIS
is to improve the effectiveness, efficiency[,] and equity of schools" and to improve "social,
emotional[,J and academic outcomes for all students").
32 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating education is a principal
instrument in achieving these goals).
33 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 ("That [boards of education] are educating the young
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.").
34 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972)
("[Plublic schools rank[] at the very apex of the function of a State.").
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in society. 35 Despite this nexus between public education and legal
socialization, 36 "public school entrance is often reported as the [first] occasion
of stigma learning, the experience sometimes coming very precipitously on the
first day of school, with taunts, teasing, ostracism, and fights." 37 Unfortunately,
schools, administrators, and teachers, as state actors, are often the impetus for
this stigma learning for schoolchildren through the imposition of shaming
punishments.3 8
These punishments are ineffective methods of school discipline, like
exclusionary and corporal punishments, as they are nondeterrent,
nonrehabilitative, and nonreformative. 3 9 In addition to being ineffective,
shaming punishments are deleterious school disciplinary methods that inflict
substantial and unacceptable harm on both the punished students and the greater
school community, similar to the damages that result from exclusionary and
corporal punishments. 40 Consequently, in alignment with the call for the end of
exclusionary and corporal punishments as methods of school discipline,4 1 it is
time for a cessation of the infliction of in-school stigmatizing punishments upon
schoolchildren.
A. School Shaming Punishments and Stigma-A Definitional
Framework
Many public schools are now implementing in-school shaming punishments
as an alternative or corollary sanction to exclusionary and corporal
35 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (describing how schools prepare students to participate and
engage in society).36 Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Developmental Due Process: Waging A Constitutional
Campaign To Align School Discipline with Developmental Knowledge, 82 TEMP. L. REV.
929, 930 (2009) ("Public schools are critical sites in children's legal socialization. Serving
close to ninety percent of our country's elementary and secondary students, public schools
imprint better and worse versions of the Constitution-in-practice on children's nascent legal
consciousness.").
3 7 ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA 33 (1963).38 See Maurice R. Dyson, Promise Zones, Poverty, and the Future of Public Schools:
Confronting the Challenges ofSocioeconomic Integration & School Culture in High-Poverty
Schools, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 711, 732-33 (2014) (describing a school's practice of
publicly singling out and isolating elementary school students with unfinished homework in
the cafeteria during lunch as a shaming punishment that generates stigma).
3 9 See infra Part II.B.1.
4 0 See infra Part II.B.2-3.
4 1 Eg., Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 73-74
(2016) (analyzing the harm of exclusionary discipline and calling for its reform as "a
necessary intervention to ensure adequate and equal educational opportunities"); Letter from
John B. King, Jr., U.S. Sec'y of Educ., to Governors and Chief State School Officers 1 (Nov.
22, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/files/corporal-punishment-dcl-
11-22-2016.pdf [https://perma.ccIQ8CW-V6B5] (advocating for the elimination of harmful
school corporal punishment).
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punishments.4 2 School shaming is a disciplinary method of publicizing a
student's alleged wrongful behavior in the school community, "where such
behavior is perceived to have violated a social norm." 4 3 School shaming
punishments are designed to stigmatize a noncompliant student." Erving
Goffman, the most influential symbolic interactionist sociologist of the
twentieth century, 45 deemed stigma to be "an undesired differentness," 4 6 which
dehumanizes the person targeted by its infliction. 47 This dehumanization and
subordination occur when schools shame students.48 The stigma that
accompanies shaming punishments has a magnifying and multiplying effect, as
it results in the imputation of an extensive array of imperfections based only on
the original one.49 Thus, these punishments demarcate the student as "the other,"
as compared to the "normal" school community. 5 0
B. Shaming Punishments-An Equally Ineffective and Harmful School
Disciplinary Alternative
There is scant reliable data on the imposition of noncorporal shaming
punishments in schools.5 1 This dovetails with a broader paucity of
42 See supra Part I (detailing a variety of school shaming punishments).
43 Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 Wis. L. REv. 625, 665
(2011) (citing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMs 76 (2000)).
44 See Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy ofShaming Sanctions
in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2186, 2188 (2003) ("[S]haming penalties usually
stigmatize the offender to an extent that would not occur in their absence ... [and] attempt
to mark the offender publicly as a deviant.").
4 5 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 709 (1986) (describing the primacy of Goffman's
sociological theory).
4 6 GOFFMAN, supra note 37, at 5.
4 7 1d ("By definition, of course, we believe the person with a stigma is not quite
human.").
4 8 See Clarke, supra note 18, at 22 ("Stigmatizing practices go beyond expressing
disapproval of a particular act or behavior to impose a 'spoiled identity' on their targets."
(citing GOFFMAN, supra note 37, at 2-3)).
9 GOFFMAN, supra note 37, at 5 (identifying the compounding nature of stigmatizing
shaming).
50 Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and
Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263, 286 (1995) (discussing this shaming
demarcation).
51 E g., Lewis R. Katz & Carl J. Mazzone, Safford Unified School District No. I v.
Redding and the Future of School Strip Searches, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 363, 363-64
(2010) (discussing the underreporting of school strip searches because most states and school
boards do not have requirements for their data collection, resulting in most only becoming
known "when a student has the courage to tell a parent"); School Climate and Discipline,
U.S. DEP'T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/index.html#featured
[https://perma.ce/NG9N-UJSV] (last updated Jan. 4, 2017) (featuring no mention of shaming
punishments in the "tools, data[,] and resources" available on the website for
"[a]dministrators, educators, students, parents[,] and community members").
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comprehensive data in the area of school discipline, 52 as the decentralization of
education makes it an exceedingly difficult area to monitor as an empirical
matter.53 Existing federal and state efforts to track discipline have revolved
around exclusionary punishments, 54 law enforcement referrals, 55 or corporal
punishments.56 There are not analogous reporting mechanisms for shaming
punishments. 57 Because shaming punishments are not monitored systematically
and comprehensively, this lack of transparency in their use fails to establish their
efficacy and carries with it inherent harm for individual students and larger
school communities. Without accurate public reporting of the use of school
shaming punishments and their impact on schoolchildren, there is little
accountability regarding their imposition and little internal impetus to advocate
for their cessation.58
Given the lack of transparency regarding shaming punishments and the
relative clarity of the lack of deterrent value and substantial harm of
exclusionary and corporal punishments, 59 it appears that schools and their
employees may utilize in-school, noncorporal shaming punishments under a
false perception that they are a more beneficial and less detrimental alternative
to other punishments. However, this rationale is a false and faulty one. As a
52 Logan J. Gowdey, Note, Disabling Discipline: Locating a Right to Representation of
Students with Disabilities in the ADA, 115 COLuM. L. REv. 2265, 2277 n.58 (2015)
(discussing the lack of a systematic collection of school discipline data).
53 Note, supra note 44, at 2189 (noting "the lack of any systematic structure for
imposing such [shaming] penalties has made comprehensive data collection on the issue
virtually impossible").
54 See Daniel J. Losen, Discipline Policies, Successful Schools, Racial Justice, and the
Law, 51 FAM. CT. REv. 388, 389 (2013) (discussing the U.S. Department of Education's
Office for Civil Rights' collection of data on school exclusionary punishments).
55 Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REv. 861, 888-89
(2012) (outlining law enforcement referrals in school disciplinary data).
56 Eg., School Climate and Discipline, supra note 51 (including multiple federal and
state statistical and advocacy resources related to exclusionary and corporal punishments).
57 See, e.g., Discipline Report, ED.Gov, http://ocrdata.ed.gov/DataAnalysisTools/DataSet
Builder?Report-6 (click on "Search for Schools Based on Data Element Criteria" then click
on "Discpline") (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (defining discipline criteria only as
"students who received at least one out-of-school suspension[,] students who received an
expulsion[,] and students referred to law enforcement").
58 Daniel J. Losen, Conclusion, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP 241, 248
(Daniel J. Losen ed., 2015) ("[Uintil discipline data are incorporated into the broader
accountability rubrics used by states to evaluate schools and districts, it is unlikely we will
witness comprehensive and lasting improvements in the area of school discipline."); Jason
P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for Change, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
313, 362 (2016) (arguing required school discipline data collection is a necessary measure
for accountability and effecting change).
5 9 Black, supra note 41, at 4 (discussing the nondeterrence and substantial harm of
exclusionary school discipline); Brown, supra note 36, at 955 (outlining research that finds
"the absence of a legitimate pedagogical purpose for the use of physical punishment and the
probability that such disciplinary methods are far more likely to harm both individual
students and the learning enterprise overall").
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preliminary matter, exclusionary punishments and corporal punishments are
shaming punishments, 60 as they fit within their definitional framework. 61
Further, the actuality is that shaming punishments are an equally ineffective and
harmful disciplinary alternative.
As such, the corollaries between these types of school sanctions are an
important jumping-off point in the examination of the parallel lack of efficacy
and the significant damage they inflict. The first part of this analysis, then, must
include the ideology of effective discipline, which is "an institutionalized
response to the violation of some official rule or regulation proscribing certain
conduct and is imposed for the purpose of rehabilitating the offender, deterring
the offender and others ... from committing the violation in the future, and
inflicting some measure of social retribution for the harm . .. done." 62
Exclusionary, corporal, and in-school shaming punishments satisfy only that
last criteria of this foundational definition, because they are all examples of
retributive, deleterious punishments for students. 63 Like exclusionary and
corporal punishments, shaming punishments are equally ineffective; they are
nondeterrent, nonrehabilitative, and nonreformative.64 Like exclusionary and
corporal punishments, shaming punishments inflict substantial and lasting harm
on individual studentS6 5 and generate equivalent negative societal collateral
consequences. 66 Therefore, just as exclusionary and corporal punishments
should be abandoned as methods to sanction schoolchildren, shaming
punishments likewise should be abandoned.
1. School Shaming Punishments Are Inefficacious
School shaming punishments do not satisfy a standard of efficacy, as they
fail to meet the criteria of deterrence, rehabilitation, and reformation. These
punishments fall squarely within Professor Braithwaite's definition in Crime,
Shame and Reintegration of stigmatic disintegrative shaming, which involves
60 See James Q. Whitman, Essay, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1998) ("[E]very punishment can involve some element of shaming.").
61 See Nora V. Demleitner, Is There a Future for Leniency in the U.S. Criminal Justice
System?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1241 (2005) (reviewing JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH
JUSTICE (2003)) (noting shaming is exclusionary); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Ci. L. REV. 591, 611 (1996) (connecting shaming and corporal
punishment); Judith A.M. Scully, Examining and Dismantling the School-to-Prison
Pipeline: Strategies for a Better Future, 68 ARK. L. REv. 959, 987 (2016) (arguing
exclusionary punishments "increase student shame, alienation, and feelings of rejection"
(quoting LAURA FAER & SARAH OMOJOLA, Fix SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: How WE CAN Fix
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE TOOLKIT 5 (2012), http://www.smcoe.org/assets/files/about-smcoe/Fix-
School-Discipline-Toolkit-for-Educators.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z4F-VXLK])).
62 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 685-86 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
6 3 See infra Part II.B.1.
6See infra Part II.B.1.
65 See infra Part 1I.B.2.
66 See infra Part II.B.3.
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an individual, intense condemnation of the punished and which creates
community division through the creation of a class of outcasts.67 With
disintegrative school shaming punishments, like exclusionary punishments and
corporal punishments, 68 positive social norms are neither expressly taught nor
internalized, which destroys the efficacy of a positive disciplinary measure in
schools.69 When positive social norms are neither expressly taught nor
internalized, the punished student has no guidance on how to ascribe to those
norms.70 Consequently, shaming punishments are inherently ineffective.
Like exclusionary 7' and corporal punishments,72 disintegrative shaming
punishments are ineffective because they are unlikely to act as specific
deterrents for future rules-violative behavior by the punished student.73 These
sanctions will not achieve individual deterrence when the punished student
disagrees with the validity of the shaming imposed for the targeted behavior,74
6 7 JoHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 55 (1989). Throughout this
Article, criminal punishment theory will be used to support the cessation of shaming
punishments in schools. These connections are relevant, given the parallels between state
control in the criminal justice system and America's schools. See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan,
Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 WASH. L. REV. 71, 73 (2010) (discussing the
frequency of court opinions that analogize constitutional rights in schools to constitutional
rights in prisons).
6 8 See, e.g., Murray A. Straus & Carrie L. Yodanis, Corporal Punishment by Parents:
Implications for Primary Prevention ofAssaults on Spouses and Children, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 35, 38 (1995) ("[E]xperience with corporal punishment lays the groundwork
for the norms legitimizing violence of all types .... .").
69 See Sandeep Gopalan, Changing Social Norms and CEO Pay: The Role of Norms
Entrepreneurs, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 18 (2007) (arguing a shaming sanction is only effective
when the corresponding norm is discovered and internalized).
70 See Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some
Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse ofProbation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75,
147 (2000) (arguing shaming punishments minimize or even eliminate the offender's
incentive to conform to societal norms).
71 Black, supra note 26, at 833 (discussing how school exclusionary punishment
"becomes a predictor, rather than a deterrent, of later ... discipline problems").
72 Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 983, 1020 (1996) (arguing corporal punishment is not an effective way to control
children's behavior); King, supra note 41, at 2 (discussing the nondeterrence of school
corporal punishments).
73 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 67, at 59-60 (concluding disintegrative shaming does not
have a specific deterrent effect); see also Clarke, supra note 18, at 21 ("Whether shaming is
generally effective in shaping behavior, as an empirical matter, is disputed and depends on
context."); Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys To Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1059, 1104 n.247 (2009) (noting the
conjectural nature of shaming's deterrent effects).
74 Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special
Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 369, 374 (1999) (arguing that sanctions
will fail if the punished individual "shrugs off the criticisms as a product of ignorance,
malice, or envy").
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and they do not guarantee contrition. 75 Further, shaming punishments can have
the inverse effect of intended deterrence; 76 the imposition of shame can lead to
more state-deemed shameful behavior.77 Given the continuing cognitive
development throughout childhood and adolescence, 78 school shaming
punishments do not serve as effective individual deterrents. 79
Like exclusionary punishments 80 and corporal punishments,81 school
shaming punishments also do not necessarily have a general deterrent effect for
other schoolchildren. 82 Professor Braithwaite argued that disintegrative
shaming sanctions do not act as deterrents for the greater community, because
"public exhibitions of state acts of brutality . . . [do] as much to legitimate
brutality as [they do] to delegitimate" the rules-violative behavior.83 Any
deterrent-effects justification for school shaming is weakened by the fact that
the school cannot accurately gauge the community reaction to such shaming.84
Shaming penalties, which inherently rely on the creation of emotion in the
community to deter future behavior within the student body, are problematic in
75 Martha Minow, Essay, Forgiveness, Law, and Justice, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1615,
1620 (2015) ("Law may force statements of apology and forgiveness, but it cannot compel
the feelings they are meant to express.").
76 See Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of Emotional Legal
Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1045, 1064 (2006) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY:
DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004)) (highlighting the immunizing nature of shaming on
its intended targets).
77 Horwitz, supra note 70, at 147-48 ("[T]he mere labeling of an offender as deviant
can actually lead to further deviant behavior.").
78 Alicia N. Harden, Rethinking the Shame: The Intersection of Shaming Punishments
andAmerican Juvenile Justice, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 93, 114-15 (2012) (arguing
thatjuvenile shaming punishments fail as general and specific deterrents because adolescent
brain development indicates children cannot reason like adults).
79 Amy E. Halbrook, Juvenile Pariahs, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 51 (2013) ("Lack of
maturity undermines the goal of deterrence . . . .").
8 0 Brown, supra note 36, at 963 (deeming exclusionary punishments as
"counterproductive, igniting student hostility toward school officials and eroding the sense
of school connectedness critical to a student's academic success and behavioral
improvement").
81 Deana Pollard, Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 TUL. L. REV. 575, 578
(2003) (stating corporal punishment is an ineffective teaching method).
82 See John A. Bozza, "The Devil Made Me Do It": Legal Implications of the New
Treatment Imperative, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 81-82 (2002) (discussing the
theoretical nature of deterrence theory with shaming punishments); Stephen P. Garvey, Can
Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 753-54 (1998) (finding the lack of
empirical inquiry regarding shaming punishments makes deterrence claims "highly
speculative").83 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 67, at 59.
84 Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, "Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the
Woman ofShame ": Thinking About the Law, Shame, and Humiliation, 24 S. CAL. REv. L. &
Soc. JUST. 1, 24 (2014) (discussing the weakened nature of a deterrence justification based
on the government's inability to assess public reaction to shaming).
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that human emotion is an unpredictable variable for deterrence.85 Also, the
commonplace use of school shaming punishments significantly mitigates their
deterrent value. 86 "When the basis for students' trust in school officials has been
eroded through personal mistreatment or observing the mistreatment of others,
little hope for rule compliance exists as their bond with authority has been
compromised."87 Therefore, shaming punishments are inefficacious as they
have neither a specific nor a general deterrent effect.
Finally, school shaming punishments fail to meet a standard of efficacy as
they run counter to rehabilitation and reformation,88 like exclusionary and
corporal punishments. 89 Rehabilitative dispositions are geared toward the
alleviation of harmful conditions to improve punished students; they are not
inflicted to make students suffer for their conduct.90 Reformative discipline aims
to transform punished students through appeals to their morality and
conscience. 91 Although schoolchildren who violate school rules and policies are
uniquely situated to benefit from rehabilitative and reformative discipline,92
school shaming punishments are neither rehabilitative nor reformative. 93 When
schools implement harsh and punitive discipline, like shaming punishments,
undesirable conditions are not alleviated, as is the goal with rehabilitative
85 Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 233-34 (2005) (noting the deterrent effect of shaming
penalties cannot be predicted due to unpredictable human emotion).86 Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Argument from
Moral Burdens, 28 CARDozo L. REV. 2629, 2636 (2007) (discussing the erosion of a
deterrent effect when shaming punishments become a standard of course).87 Brown, supra note 36, at 994.88 See generally Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAvIs L. REv.
1231, 1262 (2013) (discussing the differences between rehabilitation and reformation).
89 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures ofPunishment, 68 STAN. L. REv. 933, 965 (2016)
(discussing how exclusionary punishments "deprive the offender of recognition in the social
world" rather than rehabilitating or reforming them); Edwin J. Lukas, Book Review, 58
HARv. L. REv. 630, 630 (1945) (reviewing THORSTEN SELLIN, PIONEERING IN PENOLOGY
(1944)) (arguing child corporal punishment is antithetical to modem culture, which values
reformation in schools).
9 0 Martin R. Gardner, "Decision Rules" and Kids: Clarifying the Vagueness Problems
with Status Offense Statutes and School Disciplinary Rules, 89 NEB. L. REv. 1, 21 (2010)
(defining the nature of rehabilitative punishments).
91 Cf Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining System,
88 CORNELL L. REv. 1425, 1430 (2003) (discussing reformation in punishment theory).
92 Recent Case, Criminal Law-Sex Offender Registration-Ninth Circuit Holds that
Retroactive Application ofSORNA to Juvenile Violates Ex Post Facto Clause-United States
v. Juvenile Male, 581 F3d 977 (9th Cir. 2009), 123 HARv. L. REV. 1524, 1530 (2010)
(claiming lower rates of recidivism demonstrate juvenile offenders are particularly
responsive to rehabilitation).
93 See Courtney Guyton Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness,
Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of
Prostitutes' Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1525, 1547 (1996) (arguing shaming sanctions are
not effective mechanisms of rehabilitation).
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treatment; instead, undesirable conditions are aggravated. 94 Further, these
punishments, by perpetuating the negative indignation of shame, lack the
potentiality of individual reformation, 95 analogous to the result of the immoral
infliction of exclusionary and corporal punishments in schools.
In conclusion, like exclusionary and corporal punishments, shaming
punishments are inefficacious disciplinary methods in an educational
environment. They are all examples of purely retributive punishments, 96 which
solely justify the suffering of the penalized student on the notion that the student
deserves the suffering, rather than any beneficial consequences that might be
achieved by the discipline. 97 In fact, shaming punishments fall squarely within
the Kantian definition of retributivism, as they implement the idea that the
student "must be punished, regardless of the consequences." 9 8 The disciplinary
ideology that a student who allegedly violates school rules deserves the shaming
punishment," and its attendant moral condemnation and assignation of stigma,
with little hope of ameliorative consequences, 100 has no place within the
schoolhouse gate. Further, shaming punishments lack efficacy in terms of the
instillation or communication of positive social norms.10 1 School shaming
punishments are therefore nondeterrent, nonrehabilitative, and
94 Brown, supra note 36, at 963 ("[S]chools exhibiting a harsh and punitive disciplinary
approach diminish the likelihood that students will view the school as supportive.").
95 See Chad Flanders, The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 49 GA. L. REV.
383, 429 (2015) (postulating that all punishments should be constrained by whether they
provide the possibility of moral reform).
96 See Xiyin Tang, Shame: A Different Criminal Law Proposal for Bullies, 61 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 649, 657 (2013) (discussing shaming's retributive nature); Developments in the
Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1234 n.10 (1979) (arguing the imposition of sanctions for "purely
retributive reasons . . . cause[s] needless suffering with no beneficial consequences").
97 Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment,
96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 847-48 (2002) (defining retributivism as a concept that "justifies
punishment, or the suffering by the punished, not on any actual good consequences that
might be attained, but solely because the punished deserve it").
98 Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2159 (2001).
99 See Kahan, supra note 61, at 601-02 ("A retributivist punishes because, and only
because, the offender deserves it." (quoting Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of
Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 179 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987))).
1 00 See GabriellaBlum, The Crime and Punishment ofStates, 38 YALEJ. INT'LL. 57,59
(2013) (defining the goals of punitive action as "to assign blame and engage in retribution").
101 See John Bronsteen et al., Retribution and the Experience ofPunishment, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 1463, 1496 (2010) ("To the extent that the goal of punishment is to communicate
condemnation to offenders, communicating the appropriate message depends upon imposing
appropriate, proportional levels of negative experience.").
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nonreformative.1 02 Consequently, these counterproductive punishments should
be eliminated from school use under an efficacy or utilitarian theory. 0 3
2. Shaming Punishments Inflict Substantial and Lasting Harm on
Individual Students
Like exclusionary1 04 and corporal punishments, 0 5 school shaming
punishments inflict substantial and lasting harm on the students who have been
deemed rule violators in the school community.1 06 The stigma that results from
shaming punishments creates isolation, exacerbates anger, and often instigates
magnified antisocial behaviors in the penalized children. 107 These negative
outcomes can impact the students' continued success in the school community
and in broader society. 0 8 The detrimental outcomes that result from shaming
punishments do not stop in childhood; they can extend to have permanent
destructive effects into adulthood.1 09 Because these shaming punishments inflict
substantial and lasting harm on students, schools and their employees should no
longer employ them as disciplinary measures.
School shaming punishments impermissibly isolate the punished child from
the rest of her or his community.110 The harm of this isolation is not just
immediate through the duration of the punishment; what is equally, if not more,
damaging is the continued isolation that resonates after the punishment
102 Jill Wieber Lens, Justice Holmes's Bad Man and the Depleted Purposes of Punitive
Damages, 101 KY. L.J. 789, 801 (2012-2013) (discussing the disconnects between
retributivism and deterrence); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal
Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880, 1918 (1991) (positing that shaming does "not have impressive
specific deterrence or rehabilitative effects").
103 See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 82, at 741 (discussing how utilitarianism "finds
punishment justified if and only if it enhances social utility"); Gopalan, supra note 69, at 18
(arguing shaming does not work as a social sanction when the social norms at issue are not
internalized).
104 Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Impact of Mariuana Legalization on Youth & the
Need for State Legislation on Marijuana-Specific Instruction in K-12 Schools, 44 PEPP. L.
REv. 71, 107 (2016) (discussing school exclusionary punishment's infliction of substantial
present harm on schoolchildren and permanent impact on educational access and
attainment).
10 5 Deana A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM.
U. L. REV. 447, 448-49 (2002) (discussing the correlation and probable causation between
child corporal punishment and numerous negative psychological and socioeconomic
conditions).
106 See Clarke, supra note 18, at 22 ("Those targeted by shaming practices often
internalize stigma, coming to believe themselves to be deficient.").
1 0 7 See infra text accompanying notes 110-21.
10 8 See infra text accompanying notes 122-29.
109See infra text accompanying notes 130-34.
110 Blum, supra note 100, at 94 ("Punishment places the punished outside civilized
community.").
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period. 111 When children are stigmatized through shaming, they will adopt
parallel beliefs about diminished self-identity and self-worth as those in the
school community, thus learning and internalizing their own devaluation by the
school and larger society. 112 Shaming that takes place with the school
community as audience exploits and creates an "anxiety that ... [includes] a
fear of abandonment or isolation, usually from a social group or other
community that is necessary or valuable to the individual." 1 i 3 This exploitation
of anxiety that occurs in shaming punishments has a significantly harmful effect
on vulnerable schoolchildren. 114
School shaming punishments are also harmful as they can exacerbate
existing hostilityl"5 or instigate previously nonexisting antisocial behaviors
within the penalized student 1 6 instead of encouraging the student to adopt
positive behaviors.1 17 When students who are shamed in schools disagree with
the validity of the punishment, they are likely to feel anger rather than
remorse.11 8 This resentment and anger can lead to a desire to retaliate and to
engage in additional, intentional rule-breaking conduct.11 9 Thus, school
shaming punishments can incite a cyclical response of degradation, where the
shaming leads to student retaliation, which results in additional shaming or other
equally harmful discipline. 120 The aggravation of existing hostility or the
generation of new antisocial behaviors can lead to further isolation of the
1I Cara Suvall, Essay, Restorative Justice in Schools: Learning from Jena High School,
44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 553 (2009) (discussing how alienating and isolating
punishments weaken existing bonds between punished students and the school community).
112 David L. Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications of
Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 734 (1973) (identifying the self-devaluation
of the stigmatized child through the adoption of the same identity beliefs of others in the
school).
I 1 3 Massaro, supra note 102, at 1902.114 See Garfinkel, supra note 25, at 421 (highlighting the "ritual destruction" of
shaming); Kahan, supra note 61, at 638 (discussing the loss of peer respect and diminution
of self-esteem that results from shaming).
1 15 Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REv. 949, 1005
(2009) (noting the anger and resistance-inducing effects of punitive shaming sanctions).
1 16 Horwitz, supra note 70, at 148 ("[S]haming punishment[s] can induce anger or rage,
resulting in further violent and antisocial behavior.").117 Maxine D. Goodman, Shame, Angry Judges, and the Social Media Effect, 63 CATH.
U. L. REV. 589, 600 (2014) (arguing shame does not modify behavior positively).
1 18 Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling's Martyrdom: The Case for Criminalization Without
Incarceration, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 459, 485 (2010) (noting the anger, rather than remorse,
shamed individuals feel when they disagree their conduct was wrongful).
1 19 Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 648 (1997) ("Psychological accounts of shame suggest that
the behavioral consequences of this emotion are unpredictable, and may include anger and a
desire to retaliate against the one inflicting the shame.").
120 Goodman, supra note 117, at 605 (describing the harm of the "shame-anger cycle").
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individual student from the community and increasingly punitive harm being
directed toward the student.'21
The negative outcomes associated with shaming punishments can also
impact the punished student's continued success in the school and larger
communities.1 22 Disintegrative school shaming "foster[s] exclusion and mete[s]
out shame and humiliation[,] mak[ing] it easier for young people to look upon
their society and their futures with suspicion and despair, rather than
anticipation and hope."l 23 This environment of shaming can dictate whether
children will drop out of the school environment1 24 because an educational
environment that inflicts shame provides students with little inducement to
remain invested in the school community.1 25 There may also be external
pressures on the school administration to facilitate the push-out of these
students. 126 Further, shaming sanctions can guide the student toward harmful
and perhaps criminal subcultures because they intentionally alienate the
punished student from preexisting peer groups. 127 Finally, as an extreme
consequence, shaming can lead to the attempted or actual premature end of the
student's life by suicide. 128 Consequently, school shaming punishments can
have a permanent negative impact on a child's educational attainment and
community involvement.1 29
121 E.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 76, at 236 (discussing how shaming leads to "great
alienation from society and its norms, which may well lead to greater violence" and likening
shaming to "using gasoline to put out a fire").
122 See Garvey, supra note 82, at 749 (noting how shaming motivates the individual to
leave the community).
123 Henry A. Giroux, Youth in a Suspect Society: Coming of Age in an Era of
Disposability, TRUTHOUT (May 5, 2011), http://truth-out.org/news/item/923:youth-in-a-
suspect-society-coming-of-age-in-an-era-of-disposability [https://perma.cc/YP45-KEUM].
124 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 114-15 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (finding inequitable education environments "influence a child's decision to
'enter or remain in school"' (quoting Gaston Cty. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 296
(1969))).
1 25 Gaston Cty., 395 U.S. at 296 (discussing this impact).126 See Dean Hill Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform: Litigating School
Exclusion, 75 TENN. L. REV. 265, 280 (2008) (explaining school discipline can result in other
students' parents complaining that the punished students are classroom disruptions or safety
problems, which further isolates them from their peers).
127 E.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 76, at 236 (arguing shaming "reinforce[s] a tendency to
identify oneself with antisocial groups"); Note, supra note 44, at 2201 (discussing shaming's
alienating impact).
1 28 Garvey, supra note 82, at 749 (defining the suicide effect of shaming as "self-
destruction as the subject of shame tries to rid himself [or herself] of it").
1 29 See Markel, supra note 98, at 2174 n.84 ("[I]f the reputation of an offender is
completely destroyed by [shaming], the punishment of the offenders never ends, thus
vitiating an important possibility that an offender can be punished and then 'move on' in
some manner productive to society."); Sarah E. Redfield & Jason P. Nance, American Bar
Association: Joint Task Force on Reversing the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 47 U. MEM. L.
REV. 1, 96-97 (2016) (arguing more severe school punishments can result in a student
entering the school-to-prison pipeline).
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Finally, shaming punishments can have detrimental effects into
adulthood.130 These individual collateral consequences include extensive
psychological, physical, and socioeconomic harms. 13 1 Students who have been
shamed in schools often are discouraged from pursuing future educational or
professional opportunities because the infliction of stigma has made them
believe that any investment in their own futures is futile.1 32 Stigma can "have a
self-fulfilling criminogenic effect," resulting in adult violations of criminal
law.1 33 Inadequate and inequitable implementation and enforcement of school
shaming punishments can also play a role in later disparate outcomes like future
incarceration and employment.1 34 Because shaming punishments inflict
substantial and lasting harm on the targeted students, they are not an adequate
disciplinary measure for schools. 135
3. Shaming Punishments Inflict Significant and Enduring Community
Collateral Consequences
Like exclusionary punishments 13 6 and corporal punishments, 13 7 school
shaming punishments also can inflict significant and enduring negative
130 See Kirp, supra note 112, at 736-37 (claiming adverse school classifications manage
children's and adults' lives).
131 Wayne A. Logan, Essay, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REv. 1103,
1104 (2013).
132 Clarke, supra note 18, at 42 (discussing the futility stigmatized individuals feel in
making investments in their own futures).13 3 Logan, supra note 131, at 1107.
134 E.g., Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 771, 797
(2010) (discussing the negative impact that school discipline can have upon future
employment); Anders Walker, American Oresteia: Herbert Wechsler, the Model Penal
Code, and the Uses of Revenge, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 1017, 1057 (2009) (highlighting a
relationship between the "high number of incarcerations in the United States" and "the
failure of urban public schools").
135 See Massaro, supra note 119, at 682 (noting the grave consequences of shaming on
people, like schoolchildren, who "must depend heavily on the social group for social,
economic, or political support, or cannot leave the group easily").
136 See Emily Chiang, No State Actor Left Behind: Rethinking Section 1983 Liability in
the Context of Disciplinary Alternative Schools and Beyond, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 615, 621-22
(2012) (identifying the school-to-prison pipeline as a negative, community collateral
consequence of exclusionary punishments); Miriam Rokeach & John Denvir, Front-Loading
Due Process: A Dignity-Based Approach to School Discipline, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 279
(2006) (discussing the awareness of school disciplinary authorities of the impact of
individual expulsions on the entire school community); Kimberly Davis, Comment, School
House Gates: Please Remove Your Rights, 52 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 353, 369 (2016) (arguing
the criminalization of school discipline has resulted from exclusionary sanctions).
137 See Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of
the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C.
L. REv. 731, 764 (1996) (identifying social learning theory, where children learn or model
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community collateral consequences.1 3 8 These include the infliction of harm on
the punished student's peer group and family members, as stigma has a spillover
effect.1 39 Also, given the relative lack of transparency and accountability
attached to the imposition of shaming punishments, these disciplinary measures
can result in a negative overall school disciplinary environment. 140 Further,
shaming punishments can damage community connections within all school
constituencies and can inculcate other schoolchildren with negative norms and
values.1 4 1 This inculcation of negative norms and values in schoolchildren can
result in a naturalization of the cabining of rights. This naturalization disserves
students as they prepare to be active members of civic democracy and has a
disparate impact upon already marginalized populations within the school.1 4 2
Given these considerable community collateral consequences, schools and their
employees should no longer allow shaming punishments as a method of
discipline.
It is clear that the targeted student will endure negative consequences as a
result of shaming punishments.1 43 However, shaming can have a spillover effect
as well, often filtering out to stigmatize the punished student's family members
or peer group.'" Further, in the Internet age, shaming punishments have the
potential to extend this stigmatization of the student and his or her peers beyond
the school community, where the actual punishment is imposed, into a global
community, where the effects of the punishment can be exponentially
magnified.1 4 5 The extension of shame beyond the punished student into the
school-and perhaps global-community can be especially pernicious in that
the punished student and his or her peers can be a particularly at-risk group.1 46
Another harmful community collateral consequence of shaming
punishments is their potential to lead to an overall harsh disciplinary
the behavior they observe, as a possible causal explanation for violent behavior by children
exposed to corporal punishment).138 Kenworthey Bilz & John M. Darley, What's Wrong with Harmless Theories of
Punishment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1215, 1231 (2004) (noting how shaming penalties
introduce collateral harms in the forms of the degradation of the surrounding society); see
also Massaro, supra note 119, at 688 (noting how shaming does not lead to increased
empathy or stronger community ties).139 See infra text accompanying notes 143-46.
1 40 See infra text accompanying notes 147-54.
1 4 1 See infra text accompanying notes 155-61.
1 42 See infra text accompanying notes 162-71.143 See supra text accompanying notes 106-35.
14Kahan, supra note 61, at 643 n.215 (identifying the spillover effect of shaming
penalties).
145 E.g., Benjamin F. Heidlage, Limiting the Scarlet @: Daniel J Solove's The Future
of Reputation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 983 (2008) (reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE
FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007))
(discussing how the Internet facilitates global public shaming).
146See Massaro, supra note 119, at 685 (arguing shaming the "least dangerous
offenders ... [can] be most destructive, both to the offender and to the offender's family or
other intimates who may suffer the spillover effects of the offender's public humiliation").
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environment within the school. Shaming lacks guaranteed proportionality,1 47
which can result in excessive and irreversible punishment.1 4 8 This punitive
environment can bleed beyond the borders of a single disciplinary use of
shaming, as the resulting isolation can lead to a breakdown of empathy by
schools, administrators, and teachers for the stigmatized students, their families,
and their peer groups. 149 Thus, shaming punishments in schools can be
infectious; once used by a single teacher or administrator, they can become a
toxic standard of course. 150 Also, given the relative lack of transparency
attached to the imposition of shaming punishments, as they are not subject to
mandatory monitoring or external oversightl 5 there are no accountability
mechanisms for schools or their employees who shame students.1 52 This can
lead to increasingly retributive punishments of all students within the
schoolhouse, as once a school actor "stirs up public opprobrium against an
offender," it can be difficult to contain how other school actors will treat the
punished student and his or her peers.1 53 The generation of a mob mentality in
the context of heightened overall shaming punishments within a school
community is a particularly problematic collateral consequence of their use. 154
Other harmful collateral consequences of school shaming sanctions are that
they damage community connections and inculcate negative norms and values
in the students who must bear witness to them. 155 The shunning element of
school shaming requires that the school community publicly experience the
shaming punishment and communicate analogous condemnation for the
14 7 See Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN.
L. REv. 281, 347 (2015) (discussing how the Supreme Court deemed a student strip search
unconstitutional "in light of its lack of proportionality to the student's [alleged] offense").
14 8 Gopalan, supra note 118, at 486 (identifying the lack of architecture to ensure
proportionality in shaming and its resulting potential to impose excessive, irreversible
punishment).
149Clarke, supra note 18, at 22 ("As a result of this exclusion, empathy for the
stigmatized group breaks down.").
1 5 0 DOMINIQUE SMITH ET AL., BETTER THAN CARROTS OR STICKS 11 (2015) ("[Tlhe
actions of a single teacher can negatively affect an entire school's climate: not only is the
use of shame and humiliation to punish students toxic, but it's also highly infectious,
spreading through a grade level or department at an alarming rate.").
151 See supra text accompanying notes 51-58.152 Gopalan, supra note 118, at 486 (discussing the lack of accountability of shaming
entities).
153 Whitman, supra note 60, at 1088 (discussing the lack of control that results from
governmental shaming).
154 NUSSBAUM, supra note 76, at 4 (discussing how shaming punishments generate
inherently unreliable and uncontrollable mob justice).
155 E.g., Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension ofMegan's Law, 89 IOWA
L. REv. 1535, 1563-64 (2004) (discussing how juvenile criminal shaming sanctions harm
community connections); Massaro, supra note 102, at 1902 (denoting how shaming requires
an audience to witness it and to condemn the punished individual).
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punished student's behavior.1 56 Such required shunning harms community
connections within student constituencies, as the emotional impact of shunning
and shaming on bystanders, especially children, can be remarkably variant.157
This fracturing of community can lead to other negative outcomes, like peer-on-
peer bullying and harassment.158 Consequently, the community interaction
requirement of school shaming punishments and its subsequent fracturing can
result in an inculcation of negative norms in the students who are not being
directly targeted by the shaming, but who must also endure it.159 When dealing
with schoolchildren, this can result in the imposition of negative ethical values
upon vulnerable participants in the process,1 60 providing the inverse of the
education idealized in Brown.161
As a result of being forced participants in school shaming punishments,
which are rights violative, students will begin to naturalize the cabining of rights
because that has been their experience in schools. 162 Based on this disciplinary
educational environment, students become socialized "to tolerate and expect
similar treatment by government officials outside of schools." 63 When the
school environment incorporates rights-violative shaming conduct, these
patterns can have deleterious effects on public reason, in that students will lose
the civic capital to participate in democratic society.1 64 This lesson is even more
stratifying given the demographics of public education, which increasingly
serves marginalized minority populations that are often the targets of school
shaming.1 65 Shaming culture in schools replicates the existing social stigmas
156 Massaro, supra note 102, at 1903 ("[T]he relevant audience [of shaming] must
experience and must communicate a roughly common sense of outrage at, or contempt for,
the sanctioned member's actions.").
15 7 See Mary D. Fan, Sex, Privacy, and Public Health in a Casual Encounters Culture,
45 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 531, 590 (2011) (arguing shaming sanctions lack the ability "to be
suffused with multiple meanings that can appeal across worldviews").
158 See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1079, 1091-92 (2002) (discussing how harassment has a cumulative effect);
Whitman, supra note 60, at 1059 ("[P]ublic shaming can have the dangerous consequence
of stirring up riots and other mob actions.").
159 See Garvey, supra note 82, at 740 (rejecting certain shaming punishments as they
"teach the wrong lesson").16 0 See Gardner, supra note 90, at 34 (discussing the Supreme Court's perspective that
children are "vulnerable and dependent beings in need of protection").
161 See supra text accompanying note 34.162 See Weber, supra note 158, at 1091-92 ("If a harasser can verbally tease or
physically intimidate a child with impunity, it reinforces a sense of power and diminishes
both the perceived and real power of the child who is harassed.").
163 Jason P. Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of Students' Belongings: A Legal,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis, 84 U. COLO. L. REv. 367, 399 (2013).
164 See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765, 765-
66 (1997) (discussing the notions of reasonable pluralism in democracy and the core aspects
of public reason).
165 India Geronimo, Systemic Failure: The School-to-Prison Pipeline and
Discrimination Against Poor Minority Students, 13 J.L. Soc'Y 281, 282 (2011) (identifying
338 [Vol. 79:2
CRITIQUE OF SCHOOL SHAMING
that minority children already endure. 166 By being either the punished student
or the punished student bystander, school shaming has an acute impact on
educational equality for minority youth-especially students of color, girls, and
LGBT students. Detrimental shaming punishments result in inequitable
educational environments, foreclosing the students' opportunity to learn
valuable lessons for later success in American society.1 67 Therefore, student
naturalization of rights-violative disciplinary conduct by state authorities, with
its disparate impact on underrepresented students, is another worrisome
collateral consequence of school shaming punishments that should dictate their
removal from schools.
C. A Conclusion on the Efficacy Examination and Harm Analysis of
School Shaming Punishments
School shaming punishments should no longer be used as disciplinary
methods, as they are inefficacious and harmful. Like exclusionary and corporal
punishments,1 68 they do not meet the deterrence, rehabilitation, or reformation
criteria of effective punishment theory.1 69 Instead, they are sanctions of Kantian
retributivism, which should hold no place as disciplinary mechanisms for
children and adolescents.1 70 Additionally, like exclusionary and corporal
punishments,171 school shaming punishments result in extraordinary and
school discipline "that encourage[s] social control over marginalized populations"); Jason P.
Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1, 47 (2013) (discussing the significant
racial disparities among the targeted students of school discipline); David Simson, Exclusion,
Punishment, Racism and Our Schools: A Critical Race Theory Perspective on School
Discipline, 61 UCLA L. REV. 506, 522 (2014) (discussing the disproportionate impact that
school disciplinary actions have on minority youth); Whitman, supra note 60, at 1064 (noting
that "shame sanctions are in practice inflicted only on certain, peculiarly vulnerable classes
of offenders").
166 Dyson, supra note 38, at 730 (discussing this replicative effect of school discipline).
1 67 See Laura R. McNeal, Managing Our Blind Spot: The Role ofBias in the School-to-
Prison Pipeline, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 285, 287 (2016) (arguing punitive discipline fosters
educational inequity and denies minority students opportunities for future success).
168 Katherine Hunt Federle, Essay, Violence Is the Word, 37 Hous. L. REV. 97, 105
(2000) (noting that studies on the use of corporal punishments in schools have concluded
they are ineffective and harmful); Thalia GonzAlez, Keeping Kids in Schools: Restorative
Justice, Punitive Discipline, and the School to Prison Pipeline, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 281, 288
(2012) (noting the lack of evidence that exclusionary punishments have deterrent value).
169 See generally Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive
Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 733 (2005) (describing the goals of punishment theory).
170 See Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Progressive?: A Reply to Professor Gray
and Jonathan Huber, 70 MD. L. REV. 166, 172 (2010) ("Kant was clear that .. . a violation
of the law-whatever the law happens to be-justified retributive punishment against the
lawbreaker.").
171 Eg., Barbara Fedders & Jason Langberg, School Discipline Reform: Incorporating
the Supreme Court's "Age Matters" Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 933, 957 (2013)
(outlining school exclusionary punishments' harms); Nicole Mortorano, Note, Protecting
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enduring harm for both the penalized student and the school community.1 72
Consequently, both an efficacy examination and a harm analysis result in a solid
foundation for the rejection of school shaming punishments.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE OF SCHOOL SHAMING PUNISHMENTS
If the efficacy and harm analyses do not provide enough persuasion for
schools, teachers, and administrators to abandon shaming punishments, a
constitutional critique should do so. Although student rights are notably
limited1 73 and courts grant extensive deference to school disciplinary actions, 174
shaming punishments that violate the constitutional rights of students establish
a liability limit for school disciplinary authority. These punishments can give
rise to monetary damages and injunctive relief in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions when
schools and their actors violate students' First and Fourth Amendment rights.1 75
Further, even if these cases determine that the school entity is protected from
suit due to municipal liability requirements, 176 or that the school employee has
qualified immunity, each judicial determination that shaming punishments are
violative of the Constitution establishes valuable precedent for the future
protection of students' constitutional rights in schools, either as the basis for
future § 1983 litigation or as a deterrence mechanism against schools and their
employees from the continued use of these disciplinary methods. 177 An
awareness of these precedential constitutional violation findings and potential
liability that can result from school shaming punishments should motivate
Children's Rights Inside ofthe Schoolhouse Gates: Ending Corporal Punishment in Schools,
102 GEo. L.J. 481, 502 (2014) (discussing school corporal punishments' harms).
1 72 See Margaret E. Johnson, A Home with Dignity: Domestic Violence and Property
Rights, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1, 30 (2014) (describing how Braithwaite's shaming theory
demonstrates individual and community harms).
173 Gilbert A. Holmes, Student Religious Expression in Schools Is It Religion or Speech,
and Does It Matter, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377, 414 n.216 (1994) (discussing the Supreme
Court's consistent limitation of student rights).
174 E.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom ofExpression in the Workplace and the Problem
ofDiscriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 772 (1997) (discussing how limitations
on students' constitutional rights are justified by courts based on the need to maintain school
order and discipline).
175 See Danielle Weatherby, Opening the "Snake Pit": Arming Teachers in the War
Against School Violence and the Government-Created Risk Doctrine, 48 CONN. L. REV. 119,
129 (2015) (identifying § 1983 litigation as one of the few legal remedies that parents and
students have to redress constitutional rights violations against schools and their employees).176 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (discussing § 1983
municipal liability requirements).
1 77 See generally Richard Whitney Johnson, Trademark for Creating a Kid-Friendly
Cyberplayground on the Internet, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 465, 495 (2006) (making the
connection between clear precedent and effective deterrence).
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educational entities and educators to no longer inflict these types of
discipline.1 78
A. The Nature ofStudents' Constitutional Rights and Judicial
Deference to School Disciplinary Authority
Education bears a substantial relationship to federal constitutional rights and
guarantees. 179 State educational institutions and employees are bound to
perform within the limits of the Constitution. 80 However, there has been limited
success in aligning the complex challenges of children to their treatment by the
state in constitutional doctrine. 181 This limited success can be attributed, in part,
to the extraordinary deference that courts have afforded to schools,
administrators, and teachers in their disciplinary authority over students. 182
Schools and their employees have been given broad latitude when it comes
to student punishments.1 83 Even in the rights-expansive Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District decision, 184 the Supreme Court
recognized its repeated emphasis on "the need for affirming the comprehensive
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." 85
This control discourse has been a focal point in each of the Court's subsequent
decisions that has examined school disciplinary conduct.1 86 The Court's
178 See, e.g., Stuart L. Leviton, Is Anyone Listening to Our Students? A Plea for Respect
and Inclusion, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 53 (1993) ("Government and school administrators
are not benevolent dictators. They must be limited by some guiding principle recognizing
students' constitutional rights in light of a balance between the reasonable educator and the
reasonable student.").
179 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 1l1 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the fundamental importance of education and its close connection to
core constitutional values).
180 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985) (discussing how schools and
school officials are bound by the commands of the First and Fourth Amendments); W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (providing that schools and school
actors must "perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights").
1 8 1 See Brown, supra note 36, at 992 (discussing this alignment problem).
182 Eg., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 681-82 (1977) (granting deference to the
discretion of school authorities in assessing school discipline).
183 Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt
Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying Policy that Considers First Amendment, Due
Process, and Fourth Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 680 (2011)
("Courts generally defer to the school's judgment of what level of punishment is appropriate.
The court may weigh public policy interests in determining whether the punishment is too
harsh, but unless the facts fall heavily on the side of harm to the student, courts will accept
the form of punishment that a school chooses." (footnote omitted)).
184 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
185Id. at 507.
186 Amanda Harmon Cooley, Controlling Students and Teachers: The Increasing
Constriction of Constitutional Rights in Public Education, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 235, 247
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recognition in 1975 that "[s]ome modicum of discipline and order is essential if
the educational function is to be performed" 87 evolved in only ten years to a
"substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order
in the schools."188 Essentially, the Court has established a highly deferential
standard regarding the constitutionality of school punishments that provides that
teachers cannot educate their students without first building a strong foundation
of discipline and order. 189
So, the unique characteristics of schools result in the circumscription of
student rights.1 90 Specifically, the Court has found that First and Fourth
Amendment rights "are different in public schools than elsewhere."'91 The
Court has rooted this finding on its control discourse, which has asserted the
primacy of the state's need for supervision and control of schoolchildren over
the free exercise of students' constitutional rights.1 92 Consequently, public
school students' constitutional rights are markedly limited within the
schoolhouse gate,1 93 based on a judicial justification that maintaining order in
an educational environment requires greater controls over children than in other
contexts. 194
Even though students' First and Fourth Amendment rights are "different"
(which appears to be ajudicial euphemism for barely existent)1 95 in schools and
substantial deference has been afforded to schools, teachers, and administrators
with regard to their disciplinary authority over students, such "authority is not
unlimited."1 96 The Supreme Court has determined that these limits are exceeded
(2014) (arguing "Tinker's lasting precedent ... is its control discourse"); Amy B. Cyphert,
Addressing Racial Disparities in Preschool Suspension and Expulsion Rates, 82 TENN. L.
REv. 893, 908 (2015) (discussing the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis on the state's
comprehensive authority to "control conduct in the schools").
18 7 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (emphasis added).
1 88 New Jersey v. T.L.0, 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (emphasis added).
1 89 See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831 (2002)
(discussing the Court's deference to school disciplinary authority).
190 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (reaffirming that students'
constitutional rights are "circumscribed 'in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment"' (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506)).
191 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47K v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995); see also
Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students'Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination,
110 W. VA. L. REv. 187, 220 (2007) (discussing the Court's "school is different" ideology
in student constitutional rights cases).
192 See Acton, 515 U.S. at 655.
193 Cooley, supra note 186, at 238 (discussing how the Court's control discourse has
resulted in the "dramatic curtailment of the scope of student constitutional rights").
194 Earls, 536 U.S. at 831.
1 95 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 111, 112, 135 (2004) (arguing that students' First and Fourth Amendment rights have
been almost completely decimated due to the Court's "almost unlimited deference to school
officials").
1 9 6 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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with the imposition of school discipline that violates students' constitutional
rights, even as circumscribed as they are. 197 In Tinker, the Court stated: "In our
system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school
as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed
of fundamental rights which the State must respect . . . ."198 As to the First
Amendment, the Court has made clear that state actors cannot abridge students'
free speech rights. 19 As to the Fourth Amendment, the Court has recognized
that students still retain a legitimate expectation of privacy despite the need for
public schools to maintain discipline. 20 0 Consequently, when disciplinary
authority exceeds constitutional limits, courts should not defer to schools and
their actors.2 01 In these instances, it is appropriate for schools and their
employees to be held liable for the constitutional violations of their students'
rights through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.2 02
B. School Shaming Punishments, Students' Constitutional Rights, and
42 US.C. § 1983 Liability
Given the intensely pernicious nature of rights-violative school shaming
punishments, it appears that they have set an important bar for a growingjudicial
unwillingness to defer to school disciplinary authority. 2 03 Consequently,
schools should no longer use shaming punishments, as courts will not afford
them disciplinary deference where these sanctions result in violations of
students' First or Fourth Amendment rights that might give rise to § 1983
liability.204 Although the bulk of scholarly analysis of student constitutional
rights has been pervasively bleak,20 5 this Article's normative argument is
197 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) ("The
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools." (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960))).
1 98 1d at 511.
199 Id. at 513 ("The Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the
right to free speech. This provision means what it says.").
200 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338 (finding that despite the "difficulty of maintaining discipline
in the public schools today, the situation is not so dire that students in the schools may claim
no legitimate expectations of privacy").
2 01 See, e.g., Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind: Determining
Responsibility in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 417,
453 (1992) (discussing how abusive constitutional-violative conduct should lead to
governmental liability).
2 02 Highhouse v. Wayne Highlands Sch. Dist., 205 F. Supp. 3d 639,645 (M.D. Pa. 2016)
(discussing § 1983 remedies for constitutional rights deprivations).
2 03 See Black, supra note 26, at 866 ("Constitutional principles and logical application
of them prohibit disciplinary practices that are lacking in reason, logic, judgment, or
justification.").2 04 See infra text accompanying notes 346-48, 444-45.
2 05 See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure To Enforce Equal Protection
Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REv. 313, 320 (2010)
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actually an optimistic one for the validation and protection of student rights in
schools and a cautionary one for schools, administrators, and teachers in terms
of their disciplinary limits. It will use case examples to illustrate how certain
school shaming punishments can exceed (and can actually be judicially deemed
to exceed) the constitutional limits of the considerable deference that has been
extended to schools and their employees by the courts in disciplinary matters.
In these examples, the school entity and school employees have been held to
have engaged in rights-violative conduct via the shaming punishment, which
could potentially support the imposition of monetary, declaratory, or injunctive
relief.206 Even in cases where ultimate liability was not extended to all of the
defendants under the concepts of municipal liability or qualified immunity, all
hope is certainly not lost. This is because the establishment of the rights-
violative nature of shaming punishments paves the way for the vindication of
future student constitutional rights litigation or for the abolition of shaming
punishments as a self-correction by schools and their employees who do not
want to be subject to potential liability, 20 7 to endure the attendant negative
publicity of school shaming lawsuits, 20 8 or to violate the constitutional rights of
their students any longer.209
(noting how Congress has also acted "as though students' [constitutional] rights . . . do not
exist"); Chemerinsky, supra note 195, at 134-35 (arguing the extreme judicial deference to
school disciplinary authority has resulted in "deconstitutionalized education," specifically
within the context of First and Fourth Amendment rights); Diana R. Donahoe, Strip Searches
of Students: Addressing the Undressing of Children in Schools and Redressing the Fourth
Amendment Violations, 75 Mo. L. REV. 1123, 1168 (2010) (outlining the judicial dilution of
students' Fourth Amendment rights to the extent that "they are almost nonexistent"); Mary-
Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REv. 1027, 1084
(2008) (noting how many of the Supreme Court's decisions have "suggested that students
have diminished or even nonexistent constitutional rights"); Nadine Strossen, Essay,
Students 'Rights and How They Are Wronged, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 457,458 (1998) (deeming
Tinker a "high-water mark for students' rights" with "some sad back-sliding ... since then").
Admittedly, this analysis has included the author's own scholarship. See Cooley, supra note
186, at 289 (describing the status of student constitutional rights as "stark").2 06 See Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75
FORDHAM L. REv. 1913, 1918 (2007) ("[Section 1983] [d]amages litigation offers an
opportunity not only to compensate individuals who have been injured by unconstitutional
conduct, but to refine constitutional law as well.").
2 07 See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect
ofConstitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REv. 845, 848 (2001) (arguing there is a deterrent
effect when damages are imposed on state employees in § 1983 lawsuits).
208 Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1449, 1491 (2009) (identifying the negative publicity of § 1983 liability as the primary
motivating factor in governmental remedial actions).
2 09 See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, Essay, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105
Nw. U. L. REv. 1679, 1685 n.19 (2011) (discussing how education about litigation risks to
avoid liability can influence future actions made by employees).
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1. Students' Constitutional Rights and 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Liability
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs are granted a federal remedy for
deprivations of their constitutional rights by people acting under the color of
state law.210 Section 1983 actions are often difficult cases for student plaintiffs
to win211 because there are three preliminary postural hurdles that must be
cleared to obtain a positive judgment in these constitutional tort lawsuits.212
These hurdles are sovereign immunity, the requirements for municipal liability,
and qualified immunity.
First, the defendant must not qualify for Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity. 213 Sovereign immunity insulates state governments and their
instrumentalities, deemed to be "arms of the State," from liability in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 lawsuits. 214 Conversely, local governing bodies are "persons" under
§ 1983,215 which means they can be sued for monetary, declaratory, or
injunctive relief in these federal lawsuits. 216 Local school boards, school
districts, and school corporations are typically found not to meet the sovereign
immunity threshold of being an arm of the state and instead to be local
government bodies that are subject to § 1983 actions, thereby not qualifying for
sovereign immunity. 217
21042 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing the elements for a civil federal constitutional
action).2 11 Matthew J. Silveira, Comment, An Unexpected Application of 42 U.S. C. § 14141:
Using Investigative Findings for § 1983 Litigation, 52 UCLA L. REv. 601, 604 (2004)
(noting a § 1983 claim "is easier brought than won").
212 Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 493, 574 n.405 (2006) (discussing Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity analysis in § 1983 actions); Matthew J. Cron et al., Municipal Liability: Strategies,
Critiques, and a Pathway Toward Effective Enforcement of Civil Rights, 91 DENV. U. L.
REv. 583, 606 (2014) (describing the Monell requirements as a hurdle for establishing § 1983
municipal liability); Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, Enforcing Rights, 62 UCLA L. REV. 306,
325 (2015) (classify'ing qualified immunity as a § 1983 obstacle).
2 13 See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Essay, Federalism and the Double Standard
ofJudicial Review, 51 DuKE L.J. 75, 102 n.133 (2001) (noting how sovereign immunity bars
states from being sued for money damages without their consent in § 1983 litigation).
214 Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977)
(holding arms of the state are immune to § 1983 suits); Berger, supra note 212, at 499 n.13
(noting the state has sovereign immunity as it is not a person under § 1983).
2 15 See Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of
Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REv. 261, 339 n.371 (1995) (discussing how
local government bodies are not entitled to sovereign immunity for § 1983 actions).
2 16 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (discussing § 1983
municipal liability).
2 17 See Doyle, 429 U.S. at 280 (concluding that "a local school board . .. is more like a
county or city than it is like an arm of the State"); Parker v. Franklin Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp.,
667 F.3d 910, 926 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that "as local governmental units, the school
corporations are clearly 'persons' within the ambit of § 1983").
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Second, if the school entity defendant is deemed to be a local governmental
body that is potentially subject to a § 1983 lawsuit,2 18 Monell municipal liability
must be established, whereby the constitutional deprivation must be pursuant to
an official policy or custom. 2 19 Essentially, the concept of respondeat superior
does not apply to § 1983 actions. 220 The Supreme Court held in Monell v.
Department of Social Services that:
Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body's officers. Moreover, although the touchstone of the § 1983 action against
a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a
deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments, like
every other § 1983 "person," by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for
constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" even
though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's
official decisionmaking channels.22 1
It was also determined in Pembaur v. City ofCincinnati, a plurality opinion after
Monell, that municipal liability can be established when the unconstitutional
actions are executed by a municipal official who has been delegated with final
policymaking authority by the local governing body.22 2 This Monell
requirement has placed an additional burden on plaintiffs to establish municipal
liability in § 1983 lawsuits. 223 When schools discipline students with rights-
violative shaming punishments pursuant to formal policies, a student plaintiff
will easily be able to demonstrate a foundation for municipal liability. 224 But in
2 18 See Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective
Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. REV. 777, 810 n.117 (1985) ("Municipalities and local
school districts . . . do not have sovereign immunity and are subject to damage awards for
constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.").
2 19 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
220 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tending to Potted Plants: The Professional Identity Vacuum
in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 12 NEV. L.J. 703, 722 (2012) (discussing the inapplicability of
respondeat superior in § 1983 actions).
221 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (footnotes omitted).
2 22 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-83 (1986).
223 See Laura Oren, Immunity andAccountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should
Pay?, 50 U. PiTT. L. REV. 935, 996 (1989) (noting how the Monell policy or custom
requirement makes it "increasingly difficult to establish municipal liability" in § 1983
actions).
2 24 Teressa E. Ravenell, Blame It on the Man: Theorizing the Relationship Between
§ 1983 Municipal Liability and the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.
153, 165 (2011) (discussing municipal liability that results from the enforcement of a rights-
violative, formal written policy).
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cases where the shaming punishments are not inflicted pursuant to a formal
policy, establishing school entity liability will be much more difficult.2 25
Finally, for an individual school actor, like an administrator or teacher, to
be held liable in a § 1983 action, the student's deprived constitutional rights
must be clearly established.226 Otherwise, the individual school actor will be
immune from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. 22 7 There are two
prongs for whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity: (1)
whether the alleged facts constitute a constitutional violation, and (2) whether
the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation. 22 8 A constitutional right can be clearly established even when a case
presents novel factual circumstances, because there is no requirement that
previous cases be fundamentally similar.22 9 As long as previous decisions gave
a reasonable warning that the disputed conduct violated a constitutional right,
that right can meet the clearly established prong in the denial of qualified
immunity.230
Courts have the discretion to decide the ordering of the two prongs in their
qualified immunity analyses based on the cases' circumstances. 23 1 In many
school disciplinary cases, individual school administrators or teachers have been
allocated qualified immunity, 232 "generally on a finding that the constitutional
rights at issue were not clearly established." 233 This shielding qualified
immunity doctrine for government officials is indicative of the culture of
deference that courts afford to schools and their employees in the arena of
student discipline.2 34
22 5 See Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REv. 409, 414 (2016)
("[Tihe [Monell] municipal causation requirement nonetheless often inoculates local
governments from accountability, including for conduct that would render them liable for
violations of state law." (footnote omitted)).
2 26 Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights
Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53, 89 (2008)
(discussing qualified immunity's requirements).
227 James E. Pfander, Essay, Resolving the Qualifiedimmunity Dilemma: Constitutional
Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1613 (2011) (discussing
§ 1983 qualified immunity).
228 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (articulating the two-prong inquiry for
qualified immunity).
229 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
230 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997).
231 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
232 See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police
Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1152 (2016) (noting how "qualified immunity make[s] it
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail even when their rights have been violated").
233 B.V. ex rel. T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 786 (N.D.
Ind. 2011).
234 See Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2053 (2011) (discussing
qualified immunity's impact).
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In sum, a student whose constitutional rights have been violated by being
shamed in school will face considerable burdens in obtaining a final judgment
of monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief against both the school entity and
the school actors based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requirements. 235 However, these
burdens are not insurmountable, and there is a growing body of precedent that
establishes how shaming punishments are constitutional rights violative.236 So,
even if there is a determination of no municipal liability or qualified immunity
in these cases, school entities and their employees should be made aware that
each judicial examination of shaming punishments that results in a finding of
rights-violative conduct is a step toward clearly established constitutional rights
that will provide additional examples of school entity municipal liability and
that will eventually no longer sustain qualified immunity extensions to
administrators and teachers. This developing precedent should deter schools,
teachers, and administrators from engaging in punitive school shaming
punishments to avoid future liability and its corresponding negative publicity. 237
More importantly, schools and their employees should end their use of shaming
as a method of discipline as these entities and individuals should not choose to
violate the constitutional rights of their students.238
2. School Shaming Punishments, Students' First Amendment Rights, and
42 U.S. C. § 1983 Liability
Schools that inflict shaming punishments for the exercise of student speech
rights expose themselves to potential liability via a § 1983 action premised on a
claimed violation of the First Amendment. A prevalent example of this type of
shaming punishment is the forced apology for protected speech, whereby the
school requires a public apology that stigmatizes the student for "behavior [that]
is perceived to have violated a social norm." 239 Although there have been some
judicial decisions that have determined a compelled apology sanction for speech
is not a violation of a student's First Amendment rights, 240 there has been a
235 Rachel L. Jensen & Hayley Macon, Sexual Harassment in Education, 1 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 435, 450 n.103 (2000) (noting how Monell makes it difficult for students to
prevail against school districts in § 1983 litigation); Carlos Manuel V6zquez, Eleventh
Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 859, 876-78 (2000) (discussing
qualified immunity's burden on § 1983 plaintiffs).
2 36 See infra Part III.B.1-2.
237 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Essay, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 222
(1993) (highlighting the educative value of tradition in the context of constitutional inquiries
for past and future conduct).
2 38 See id at 180 (arguing "the Constitution should be viewed as part of a body of
tradition that can teach present and future generations the principles that will allow society
not merely to change, but to mature").2 39 Grinvald, supra note 43, at 665.
240 This is not to say these were proper constitutional adjudications. See, e.g., Corder v.
Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1232 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding the school district's
compelling a student to apologize to the school community for a non-pre-approved reference
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growing body of § 1983 case law that has determined these shaming
punishments are violative of students' speech rights.24 1 Even among those cases
that have found conversely, though, there has been a recognition of the harshly
stigmatizing nature of such apologies as school disciplinary measures.242
Compelled apologies are especially problematic when such punishments are
inflicted in retribution for the truthful reporting of criminal or tortious
behavior;243 when they are imposed for the valid exercise to not engage in other
compelled speech; 244 when they are enforced against speech based on vague,
overbroad, and inherently shaming-based disciplinary policies that prohibit
dishonorable or immoral behavior; 245 or when they are based on a custom of
persistent unconstitutional misconduct.24 6 When forced apologies are issued as
shaming sanctions in these circumstances, schools, teachers, and administrators
should be sued and held liable in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. Because of this
potential for liability and because these sanctions abridge students' speech
rights, schools and their employees should no longer use compelled apologies
as shaming punishments to keep order and discipline. 247
When forced apologies are used by schools and their employees as a
retributive shaming sanction for students who report criminal or tortious
behavior of other students, courts should and will find them to be violative of
students' First Amendment rights. For example, in Seamons ex rel. Seamons v.
to Jesus Christ in her valedictory speech to receive her diploma was not a violation of the
student's First Amendment rights as the punishment was "reasonably related to the School
District's [legitimate] pedagogical concerns"); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th
Cir. 2007) (determining a high school football coach did not violate the speech rights of
student players he dismissed from the team when they refused to apologize for drafting or
signing a petition for the school to terminate the coach's employment based on his
humiliation and abuse per the Tinker reasonable-forecast-of-substantial-disruption
standard); Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir.
2001) (determining the school district and employees were entitled to summary judgment on
the student's First Amendment claim for a required apology as a punishment for writing an
insubordinate letter about her basketball coach); Kicklighter v. Evans Cty. Sch. Dist., 968
F. Supp. 712, 719-21 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (relying on the Tinker control discourse to determine
that a school district and principal were entitled to summary judgment on a student's First
Amendment claim because "to require a simple apology [in front of an entire class] for
truculent and disruptive in-school behavior [for retorting to a teacher to 'Check the
Declaration of Independence'] falls well within the ambit of an institution's balanced
'comprehensive authority"'), affd sub nom. Kicklighter v. Evans Cty. Sch., 140 F.3d 1043
(11th Cir. 1998) (mem.).
241 See supra text accompanying notes 210-17.
242 See, e.g., Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772 ("The parties perhaps could have achieved with
minimal creativity and flexibility a solution more amicable or less humiliating to the
student.").243 See infra text accompanying notes 256-70.
244 See infra text accompanying notes 271-301.
24 5 See infra text accompanying notes 300-28.
246 See infra text accompanying notes 329-45.
247 Student consent is not ajustification for these types of apologies, as consent "is valid
only if it is uncoerced." Garvey, supra note 82, at 761.
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Snow, Brian Seamons, a high school football player, was assaulted by a group
of his teammates, including two of the four team captains, in the school locker
room. 24 8 After showering, Brian was forcibly restrained by these teammates and
bound to a towel rack with highly adhesive athletic tape.24 9 A fifth teammate
then brought one of Brian's former girlfriends into the -locker room to witness
the hazing.2 50 After reporting the assault to the police, the school principal, and
the football coach, Brian and his parents were informed by the coach that the
assailants would not be disciplined or removed from the team.2 51 Four days after
the assault, Brian decided to remain on the team, and the coach relayed
everything had been resolved to the principal.2 52
However, that same afternoon, prior to a game, one of the involved team
captains demanded that Brian apologize to the team for reporting the hazing as
a condition to remain on the team. 2 53 The coach told Brian that "he needed to
'forgive and forget and apologize' to the team captains," which Brian refused to
do. 254 The coach then instructed Brian to think about it over the weekend,
because he would not play with the team until he apologized to the captains. 255
Brian's father alerted the principal, and the next week, after Brian
communicated to the coach that he was not going to apologize, the coach told
Brian that "he was 'sick of [his] attitude, sick of [his] father's attitude,' and that
he was off of the team." 256
The school's football season was cancelled the next day, and Brian and his
family filed a § 1983 lawsuit against the school district and the coach that
alleged his First Amendment speech rights were violated. 257 The district court
granted the defendants summary judgment based on a finding that Brian's
constitutional rights had not been violated, deemed the school district not to
have municipal liability, and granted the coach qualified immunity. 2 58
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed these judgments of
the district court.259 In reviewing the lower court's decision in the light most
favorable to Brian,260 the court determined that there were disputed factual
issues as to whether the coach asked Brian to apologize to the team captains,
whether the intended scope of the request was to force an apology for reporting
the assault, and whether Brian's refusal to apologize was a significant factor in




252 1d. at 1024.
253 Id
2 54 Seamons, 206 F.3d at 1024.
255 Id.
256 Id (alterations in original).
257 
_d
2 58 Seamons v. Snow, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1159-60 (D. Utah 1998).
2 59 Seamons, 206 F.3d at 1031.
260Id at 1026 (providing the standard of review for the appeal of a summary judgment
motion).
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his dismissal from the team. 26 1 In this analysis, the court noted that there were
enough clear inferences and evidence for each of these factors to support Brian's
First Amendment claim and to entitle him to his requested day in court.262
With respect to the school district's potential municipal liability, the court
adopted the Pembaur approach and determined that the school district could be
held liable for the coach's actions because the school district had delegated final
policymaking authority to the coach for decisions regarding the school's
football team.263 The Tenth Circuit also reversed the district court's grant of
qualified immunity to the coach.264 The court determined that Brian's
constitutional speech rights-not to be penalized for nondisruptive, nonobscene,
and non-school-sponsored speech-were clearly established at the time that the
coach conditioned his continued membership on the football team on a forced
apology for reporting the assault.265 Because the court determined that a
reasonably competent official would be aware of the law regarding these rights,
the coach was not entitled to qualified immunity for his punitive actions.266
Consequently, the Seamons decision sets an important precedent that
students cannot be shamed into forced apologies in retaliation for the truthful
reporting to school authorities of criminal or tortious conduct, because these
sanctions are violative of students' First Amendment rights,2 67 as circumscribed
as they are in the school environment. 26 8 Additionally, the case appropriately
illustrates a broader reading of school districts' municipal liability in § 1983
lawsuits through the application of Pembaur and how school officials will not
be shielded by the deferential qualified immunity doctrine for the violation of
students' clearly established speech rights.
When compelled apologies are used by schools and their employees as
retributive shaming punishments for students' valid exercise of their rights not
to engage in other compelled speech, courts should and will find such sanctions
to be violative of students' First Amendment rights. For example, in Holloman
ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, Michael Holloman, a high school senior, brought
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit claiming that his First Amendment rights were
violated when he was punished by the school principal and his economics and
government teacher with a forced apology and a paddling for raising his fist in
silent protest, rather than reciting the Pledge of Allegiance with his classmates,
261Id at 1027-28.
262Id at 1028, 1031.
263Id at 1029, 1031.
264Id at 1030-31.
26 5 Seamons, 206 F.3d at 1030.
266Id at 1030-31.
2 67 See John F. Wirenius, The Last Word-Status Conflicts, Individual Autonomy, and
Freedom of Speech, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 394, 422 (2000) (arguing compelled apologies
violate fundamental norms of constitutional law).
268 See Michael Sheetz, Casenote, Qualfied Immunity and Privacy-The Fifth Circuit
Finds That Students Have No Clearly Established Right to Confidentiality in Their Sexual
Orientation, 67 SMU L. REV. 219, 222 (2014) (discussing the Supreme Court's curtailment
of students' constitutional rights).
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during the daily flag salute.269 The required daily recitation of the pledge was
pursuant to a district policy. 2 70 On the day before the incident with Michael,
John Hutto, another student in Michael's class, had remained silent during the
pledge with his hands in his pockets, had been criticized for it by the teacher in
front of the class, had been threatened by the principal to have it reported to his
Air Force Academy recruiter and recommending congressperson, and had been
ordered by the principal to apologize to the teacher and the class.27 1 That
afternoon, the principal warned students that anyone who refused to say the
pledge would be punished. 2 72 The next morning, John apologized to the teacher
and the class. 273
That same morning, Michael silently raised his fist during the pledge.2 74
Following this, Michael's teacher chastised him in front of the entire class, and
Michael's principal told him that he had failed to be taught "responsibility,
morals[,] and values." 2 75 The principal penalized him with three days of
detention and a compelled apology to the teacher and the class as a condition to
receive his diploma that week. 276 However, because there were not enough days
prior to graduation, Michael was paddled by the principal in front of the teacher
instead.277
The district court granted the principal and teacher summary judgment
based on qualified immunity.2 78 It also granted the school board summary
judgment based on a determination that Michael had failed to sufficiently allege
a constitutional rights violation and that it was not subject to municipal liability
under Monell.279 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in its entirety.2 80
With regard to the principal and teacher's claims to qualified immunity on
Michael's compelled-speech claim, the court determined that the 1943 West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette case established the right of
public school students to be free from compelled speech in the forced recitation
of the pledge. 2 81 Because the court determined that evidence in the record
2 69 Holloman ex rel Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2004).
270Id at 1261-62 (implementing an Alabama statute that required the daily recitation of
the pledge as part of the character education program for all local school boards, in the






2 75 Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1261.2 76 1d
277 Id.2 78 Id
2 79 1d at 1260.
2 80 1d at 1265.
2 8 1Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1268 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).
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supported Michael's claim he was disciplined for failing to recite the pledge, the
court found that the teacher and principal's alleged acts violated his First
Amendment rights.2 82 In this finding, the court stressed that the teacher's verbal
censure of Michael in front of the class was an embarrassing and humiliating
punishment designed to dissuade him from exercising his right to be free from
governmental compelled speech: "Given the gross disparity in power between
a teacher and a student, such comments-particularly in front of the student's
peers-coming from an authority figure . . . whose words carry a presumption
of legitimacy, cannot help but have a tremendous chilling effect on the exercise
of First Amendment rights."28 3
Further, the court determined that Michael's constitutional right to engage
in this conduct had been clearly established since Barnette and that any
reasonable person would have known that this discipline would impermissibly
violate this right.2 84 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit determined that neither the
teacher nor the principal was entitled to qualified immunity on Michael's
compelled-speech claim.2 85
The court also determined that neither the principal nor the teacher was
entitled to qualified immunity on Michael's expressive-conduct speech
claim.2 86 In doing so, the court analogized Michael's silent fist raise to the black
armbands of Tinker in finding that this act could constitute either protected pure
speech or expressive conduct.2 87 Even working within the construct of limited
student speech rights and the Tinker control discourse, 2 88 the court stated that
"in assessing the reasonableness of regulations that tread upon expression, we
cannot simply defer to the specter of disruption or the mere theoretical
possibility of discord, or even some de minimis, insubstantial impact on
classroom decorum." 2 89 Consequently, because the court determined that
Michael's action did not meet the Tinker standard regarding a reasonable
forecast of substantial and material disruption, it was entitled to First
Amendment protection. 290
The court similarly rejected the teacher's claims that Michael's discipline
was appropriate based on other students disagreeing with his actions, finding
this was irrelevant to the analysis.29 1 To let these student reactions be
determinative of the constitutional inquiry would be "to sacrifice freedom upon










291 Id at 1274-75.
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inclinations of the unlawful mob." 292 As to the principal's actions, the court had
a strict admonishment as well: "Principals have the duty to maintain order in
public schools, but they may not do so while turning a blind eye to basic notions
of right and wrong." 293 The court determined that Michael's right to engage in
his conduct was clearly established under the Tinker standard that would be
reasonably understood by "the defendants-who holds [sic] themselves out as
educators." 294 Therefore, the principal and the teacher were not entitled to
qualified immunity on this claim. 295
As to the school board's assertion that it was entitled to summary judgment
under Monell, the court determined that the school board's policy that required
the daily inclusion of the pledge was a sufficient policy directive to support the
municipal liability of the school board.296 The court reversed the grant of
summary judgment to the school board, finding that the board could be held
liable for Michael's compelled speech claim.29 7 Additionally, the court
determined that the school board could be held liable for the speech-rights-
violative acts of the principal as it had delegated him final policymaking
authority on school discipline in this factual context, given the impending
graduation, the required apology, and the completed paddling.298 As a result,
the court reversed the district court's summary judgment for the school board.299
Consequently, the Holloman decision is another important precedential case
that instructs schools, administrators, and teachers that they cannot penalize
students with shaming by way of compelled apologies (or with stigmatizing
verbal censure or mob mentality chilling) for the exercise of their lawful right
to refrain from government compelled speech. These school attempts to compel
speech for exercising a right to refrain from compelled speech are exemplary of
the pernicious nature of forced apologies as shaming punishments. Additionally,
this case, like the Seamons case, appropriately illustrates a broader reading of
school districts' municipal liability in § 1983 lawsuits through the application
of the policy or delegation of final policymaking approach and provides another
example of how school officials will not be shielded with qualified immunity
for the abusive violation of students' clearly established speech rights.
School entities and their employees should also be held liable when they
require forced apologies as shaming punishments for protected student speech
pursuant to vague and overbroad disciplinary policies that prohibit dishonorable
or immoral behavior-policies that are inherently shaming based. For example,
in B. V ex rel. T. V v. Smith-Green Community School Corp., two female high
school students, sixteen-year-old T.V. and fifteen-year-old M.K., brought a
2921d at 1275.
2 93 Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1276.
2941d at 1278.
295Id at 1265.
2 96 See id at 1262, 1290-91.
297Id at 1269, 1291.
29 8 See id at 1292-93.
29 9 Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1295.
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§ 1983 claim against their school district corporation and high school principal
after they were suspended from participating in extracurricular activities for a
calendar year for posting sophomoric photographs featuring lollipops and toys
resembling sex organs to their private, password-protected social media
accounts. 300 All the photographs were taken and were posted to the Internet in
private, off-campus homes and not during the academic school year.30 1 The
plaintiffs were informed their suspensions were a consequence of a violation of
a student handbook policy that prohibited "act[ing] in a manner in school or out
of school that brings discredit or dishonor upon yourself or your school." 3 02 The
students were also informed by the principal that, under the policy, their
punishment could be reduced if they visited a counselor three times and
thereafter apologized individually to the school's all-male athletic board,303
with which they complied. 304
Subsequently, the students-through their parents-sued claiming these
shaming punishments were a violation of their First Amendment speech
rights.305 Granting the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion on this claim and
determining that the school's punishment was violative of their First
Amendment rights,306 the court concluded that the students could not be
punished for speech that did not meet the substantial disruption or reasonable
forecast of substantial disruption standard of Tinker,307 no matter how "juvenile
and silly" the speech was.30 8 In doing so, the court expressly recognized the
limits ofjudicial deference to school disciplinary authority:
With all respect to the important and valuable function of public school
authorities, and the considerable deference to their judgment that is so often
due, "[i]t would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in
the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child's home and control his/her
actions there to the same extent that it can control that child when he/she
participates in school sponsored activities." 309
300 B.V. ex rel. T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 771-74,
785 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
301Id at 771-72.
302Id. at 774.
303Id; see also Ali Elkin, Judge: Indiana Teens' Racy Social Media Photos Are
Protected Speech, CNN (Aug. 24,2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/08/19/racy.pictures.
protected~speech/index.html [https//permacc/8VKW-RVYS].3 04 B. V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
3051d at 771.
306 Id at 785.
3071d at 783-84.
3081d. at 775 ("No message of lofty social or political importance was conveyed, but
none is required.").
3091d at 784-85 (alteration in original) (quoting Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
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In addition to determining that the students' First Amendment rights were
violated by these shaming punishments as a matter of law, 310 the court denied
the school corporation's motion for summary judgment that it was entitled to
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.31 1 The school corporation argued it
had sovereign immunity because it was an arm of the state, which shielded it
from § 1983 damages in federal courts. 312 The court disagreed, noting that the
Supreme Court had determined that local school boards are often not entitled to
sovereign immunity in these actions.313
The question of municipal liability as a potential defense for the school
corporation was not disputed in this case because the shaming punishments were
propagated pursuant to the policy that prohibited student conduct that brings
"discredit or dishonor" upon the student or the school. 314 As demonstrated by
the record, the students were expressly told that they were suspended from
extracurricular activities per the policy and that a forced apology would reduce
their punishment under the policy. 3 15 Therefore, Monell's provision that
plaintiffs can sue local governing bodies in § 1983 lawsuits where the alleged
unconstitutional action executes an official policy was satisfied here, and the
school corporation could not avoid liability for its shaming punishments this
way.316
Although the court determined that the school corporation could not avoid§ 1983 liability under the concepts of sovereign immunity or municipal liability
restrictions, 317 it did find that the school principal was entitled to qualified
immunity as these First Amendment rights "were not clearly established." 318
Because the Supreme Court had not considered the extent to which, if any,
school officials could regulate off-campus, Internet student speech, the court
determined that there was uncertainty about the amount of constitutional
deference that could be afforded to a school official in this factual setting.319
This resulted in the grant of qualified immunity to the principal. 320
The court ended its discussion by finding that the school policy that allows
discipline for student conduct that brings "dishonor" or "discredit" upon the
school or student "is so vague and overbroad as to violate the [First Amendment
3 10 B. V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
311Id. at 791.
312Id. at 785.
3 13 Id. (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-
81 (1977)). The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that school corporations are local
government units and not arms of the state, thereby making them subject to suit as § 1983
persons. See Parker v. Franklin Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 667 F.3d 910, 927, 929 (7th Cir.
2012).
3 14 B. V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
315Id. at 773-74.
3 16 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
3 17 B. V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
318Id. at 790.
3 19 See id at 786.
320 Id
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of the] Constitution." 32 1 In making this determination, the court stressed that
"[t]he notion of good character inherent in [the term of 'discredit'] introduces a
nebulous degree of value judgment" and that such "[i]ssues of character and
values involve such a broad spectrum of reasonable interpretation (but also
strongly-held disagreement) as to be insufficiently conclusive for a disciplinary
standard." 322 Consequently, the court's vagueness and overbreadth
determination supported issuing an injunction against the enforcement of the
policy.32 3
This judicial dissection of school punishments imposed per vague and
overbroad morality policies supports the rejection of these shaming
punishments. When compelled apologies are used in this way, where students
are forced to be contrite for sexually expressive behavior that does not meet the
Tinker standard for conduct that "would 'materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school,"' 3 24 they can implicate harmful notions of student slut shaming.32 5 This
type of forced apology, as shaming punishment, communicates that these
students "committed a bad act that is worthy of criticism" and should be
condemned by school authority figures.326 Such nebulous value judgments
cannot take the place of established First Amendment jurisprudence, and in the
B. V ex rel. TV. case, the court appropriately drew the line in terms of its
unwillingness to defer to the school's disciplinary authority.
When schools issue forced apology shaming punishments for students
engaging in nondisruptive speech that is nebulously deemed to be dishonorable
and discreditable, they are violating the First Amendment and should be held
liable for it. The B. V ex rel. T. V decision is an important case that helps to
establish this proposition. Further, as forced apology case law for Internet
speech develops, teachers and administrators should not and no longer will be
shielded from liability with qualified immunity when they instigate such
punishments. Although numerous shaming advocates have justified forced
apologies as a cost-effective means of deterring rules-violative conduct,
exacting retribution, and reinforcing social norms,32 7 forced apologies in this
context violate students' First Amendment rights, as circumscribed as they are
at schools.328
321 Id at 790.
322 Id at 789.
323 B. V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 789.
324 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (quoting
Bumside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
325 See LiJia Gong & Alina Hoffman, Note, Sexting and Slut-Shaming: Why Prosecution
of Teen Self-Sexters Harms Women, 13 GEO. J. GENDER& L. 577, 583-87 (2012) (discussing
this phenomenon in schools).
326Ild at 583.
327 See White, supra note 22, at 1268 (listing shaming advocates' rationales for
compelled apologies).328 See Stephen E. Henderson, Hiackedfrom Both Sides-Why Religious Extremists and
Religious Bigots Share an Interest in Preventing Academic Discourse on Criminal
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Finally, schools and their employees should be held liable for shaming
forced apologies for protected speech when they are based on a custom of
persistent unconstitutional misconduct. For example, in S.S. ex rel. R.S. v.
Minnewaska Area School District No. 2149, R.S., a twelve-year-old sixth
grader, was forced to apologize to an adult hall monitor after she posted a
negative comment about the hall monitor, accessible only by her designated
friends, to her Facebook account from her home outside of school hours. 329 Her
comment was: "[1 hate] a Kathy person at school because [Kathy] was mean to
me." 330 Upon viewing this comment, the principal punished R.S. by forcing her
to apologize to the hall monitor and by giving her a detention for rude and
discourteous behavior that was memorialized in her disciplinary record.331
Thereafter, R.S.'s mother brought suit on behalf of her daughter for a violation
of her First Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the school
district and its superintendent. 332 In response to this complaint, the defendants
filed a motion to dismiss, in which the school district claimed it was not subject
to municipal liability and the superintendent claimed he was entitled to qualified
immunity. 33 3
The district court denied the school district's motion to dismiss on its
municipal liability claim,334 finding the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the
punishment of R.S. for out-of-school Internet speech was pursuant to a custom
based on an allegation of multiple students facing similar punishments.335 This
allegation supported a "finding that the school officials ... were motivated by,
and conducting themselves in accordance with, a 'continuing, widespread,
persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct."' 336 Because municipal
liability can be premised on a local governing body's custom under Monell,337
the court determined the school district could not be shielded from municipal
liability. 338
The court likewise denied the superintendent's motion to dismiss based on
qualified immunity. 339 First, it found the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to
support a finding that R.S.'s punishment was a violation of her First Amendment
Jurisprudence Based on the First Principles of Christianity, 37 IDAHO L. REv. 103, 129
(2000) ("The State has no right to coerce an apology . . . ."); see also Sheetz, supra note 268,
at 222 (discussing the Supreme Court's curtailment of students' constitutional rights).3 29 S.S. ex rel. R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1133 (D. Minn. 2012).
3 30 1d (alterations in original).
331 Id
332_Id at 1133, 1136.
3 33 See id at 1136.
334Id at 1138.
33 5 See S.S., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
33 6 1d. (quoting Mettler ex rel. Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir.
1999)).
33 7 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serys., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
33 8 See S.S., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
339Id. at 1141.
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rights.340 To do so, the court classified the alleged speech as neither a true threat
nor "so egregious as to pose a serious safety risk or other substantial disruption
in that environment." 34 1 Finally, unlike the B. V. ex rel. T. . case, the court
determined that although "[t]he standard for showing a clearly established right
is certainly stringent," the complaint sufficiently alleged R.S. had a clearly
established right to her off-campus, Internet speech. 34 2 Because a reasonable
official would understand that punishing R.S.'s speech, which was "in the
heartland of protected nonviolent and nondisruptive out-of-school speech,"
would transgress her First Amendment rights, the motion for qualified immunity
was denied.343
The S.S. ex rel. RS. case provides an important precedent that establishes
that schools and their employees do not have unlimited authority to discipline
the nondisruptive, off-campus Internet speech of their students via shaming
compelled apologies.344 Further, it establishes a relatively expansive reading of
municipal liability for school entities in terms of finding a Monell custom and
an equally expansive reading of a lack of entitlement to qualified immunity for
individual administrators by applying Tinker principles to the digital
communications of students.345 Consequently, schools and their employees
should reject adopting a customary approach to these types of shaming forced
apologies for protected Internet speech based on the possibility of ensuing
§ 1983 liability.
The receding away from traditional deference to schools' disciplinary
authority in these compelled apology cases demonstrates the particularly
egregious nature of adult educators attempting to force speech on students as a
punishment for the students' protected speech. 346 These shaming sanctions
trigger Tinker's totalitarianism tipping point,3 47 resulting in rights-recognitive
precedent for students who are punished with forced apologies for exercising
their First Amendment rights in schools, as circumscribed as they are.34 8
Additionally, these cases demonstrate broader readings of municipal liability for
school entities and narrower applications of the qualified immunity doctrine for





344S.S., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
345Id.
346 See Kristin Henning, What's Wrong with Victims' Rights in Juvenile Court?:
Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Systems ofJustice, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1107, 1167 (2009)
(discussing the impropriety of situations where "adults appear to 'gang up' on the child or
attempt to 'shame' the child into ... apology").
34 7 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
34 8 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching that Speech Matters: A Framework for Analyzing
Speech Issues in Schools, 42 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 825, 825-26 (2009) (discussing the limited
nature of students' speech rights).
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apologies as disciplinary measures based on their inefficaciousness and harm, 349
schools, administrators, and teachers should no longer inflict these stigmatizing
punishments as they face potential liability for violating their students' First
Amendment rights when they do so.
3. School Shaming Punishments, Students' Fourth Amendment Rights,
and 42 U.S.C § 1983 Liability
Schools that inflict shaming punishments on students via unreasonable and
invasive searches expose themselves to potential liability through 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 actions premised on claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment. Given
the connections between privacy and shame,350 strip searches that are used as
shaming sanctions for schoolchildren can be particularly malignant and
intrusive. 351 Student strip searches meet the definitional parameters of shaming
punishments because they are stigmatizing disciplinary measures, designed to
punish or shame,352 that are inflicted on the student in view of some members
of the school community-whether they be other adult employees or peers,353
where the student has allegedly violated a school disciplinary rule and attendant
social norms. 354
Since the Supreme Court's determination in Safford Unified School District
#1 v. Redding, which held that a student's Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by a school strip search, 355 courts have demonstrated an increased
unwillingness to defer to this exercise of school disciplinary authority.356 This
has generated a growing body of § 1983 case law that has determined these
shaming punishments violate students' privacy rights. 3 57 Although Redding has
349 See Brent T. White, Saving Face: The Benefits ofNot Saying I'm Sorry, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 261, 268 (2009) (discussing the nondeterrent nature and psychological
harms of coerced apologies).
350 Massaro, supra note 119, at 665 ("The concept of privacy seems to be bound to
shame.").
351 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA
L. REv. 1, 95 (1991) (discussing the intrusiveness of shaming governmental actions like
"searches for infractions of school disciplinary rules").
352 See id (classifying school searches as government actions where the purpose is "to
punish or shame").
3 53 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 369 (2009) (describing
how an assistant principal required a student to be strip searched by the school nurse and a
school administrative assistant); Katz & Mazzone, supra note 51, at 363 (noting how some
school strip searches are conducted in front of student peers).
3 54 See generally Grinvald, supra note 43, at 665 (discussing the definitional criteria of
shaming punishments).
3 5 5 Redding, 557 U.S. at 368.
3 56 See infra text accompanying notes 392-443; see also Aaron Sussman, Comment,
Learning in Lockdown: School Police, Race, and the Limits ofLaw, 59 UCLA L. REv. 788,
833 (2012) (identifying a baseline of judicial deference to schools' disciplinary authority in
students' Fourth Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuits).
3 57 See infra text accompanying notes 392-443.
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been criticized for not going far enough in protecting these rights and for
granting the searching school officials qualified immunity, 358 the case has
actually resulted in a clearer establishment of students' Fourth Amendment
rights in the context of strip searches than critics originally expected and in an
increased trend of courts not bestowing qualified immunity upon administrators
and teachers who strip search students.3 59 When strip searches are issued as
shaming sanctions, schools, teachers, and administrators should be sued and
held liable in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. Because of this potential liability for
rights-violative conduct and because these sanctions abridge students' privacy
rights, schools and their employees should no longer use strip searches as
shaming punishments to keep order and discipline. 360
The constitutional critique of strip searches logically begins with Redding,
in which the Supreme Court found that a thirteen-year-old honors student's
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when she was strip searched by school
officials who had reasonable suspicion that she possessed prescription and over-
the-counter drugs.36 1 In this case, Savana Redding was suspected of violating
her middle school's rules regarding possession without school permission of any
drug on school grounds.36 2 Based on another student's report, Savana was
removed from her math class by the assistant principal and directed to his office,
where he inquired if she knew anything about four prescription-strength
ibuprofens and one over-the-counter pain reliever.363 After Savana denied
knowledge of the pills, her belongings and clothes were searched, with no
contraband being found. 364
Then, at the direction of the school's assistant principal, the school nurse
and a school administrative assistant instructed Savana "to pull her bra out and
to the side and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her underpants, thus
exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some degree." 3 65 The shaming strip
search had a tremendously negative impact on Savana, who attested:
The school officials' viewing of [her] naked body was "the most humiliating
experience" of her life. . . . Embarrassed and scared, Savana held her head
down throughout the strip search "so that they could not see that I was about
to cry." . . . Throughout this ordeal, Savana was not permitted to call her
358 See, e.g., Donahoe, supra note 205, at 1150-57 (discussing Redding's shortcomings);
Nance, supra note 165, at 12 n.64 (stating the Redding qualified immunity decision makes it
difficult for students to prevail on Fourth Amendment school search claims).
359 See infra text accompanying notes 401-02, 408, 415, 422-23.
360 See Donahoe, supra note 205, at 1157 (arguing "strip searches are so invasive they
should not be used even if a school possesses a 'special need'); Katz & Mazzone, supra
note 51, at 368 (arguing that because strip searches are "qualitatively different from other
searches" they should not be allowed in schools).
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mother. . . . Following the incident, Savana, an honor-roll student at SMS,
transferred to a different school.36 6
The strip searchers did not find any pills.36 7 Savana's mother subsequently filed
a § 1983 action against the school district, the assistant principal, the school
nurse, and the administrative assistant.3 68
In its analysis, the Supreme Court classified this as a strip search that would
require elevated and distinct elements ofjustification to be reasonable based on
"both subjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy." 3 69
The Court found that Savana's "subjective expectation of privacy against such
a search is inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and
humiliating." 370 The Court affirmed the reasonableness of this expectation by
comparing it to the consistent experiences of other similarly searched
schoolchildren, where the flagrant intrusiveness of the strip searches was
intensified by their adolescent vulnerability. 3 7' This reasonable expectation was
further affirmed by the Court finding that multiple communities have banned
school strip searches as being per se unreasonable because they are inherently
degrading.372
Although the Court did not agree that all student strip searches are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,3 73 it did find this particular search
was a constitutional violation, as the administrator's suspicion of wrongdoing
did not match the level of intrusion of the strip search. 374 There was no sign of
danger to other students from the strength or quantity of these pills, and there
was no basis for believing that Savana was hiding them in her underwear. 375 In
doing so, the Court expressly rejected the school's proffered justification that it
is a universal truth that "students . . . hid[e] contraband in or under their
clothing," as such a categorically intrusive strip search cannot be based on
general possibilities and "nondangerous school contraband does not raise the
specter of stashes in intimate places." 3 76 Consequently, the Court determined
the search was unreasonable and Savana's Fourth Amendment rights were
violated.37 7 The Court then remanded the case for determination of whether the
school district could be held municipally liable under Monell because the Ninth
366 Brief for Respondent at 3, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364
(2009) (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 852123, at *3 (citations omitted).
3 6 7 Redding, 557 U.S. at 369.
3 68 See id.
369 Id at 374.
3 70 Id at 374-75.
3 7 1 Id at 375.
3 72 Id
3 73 See Redding, 557 U.S. at 375 ("The indignity of the search does not, of course, outlaw
it . . . ").
3 74 1d ("Here, the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion.").
375 Id at 376-77.
3761d at 376 (alterations in original).
3 77 See id. at 379.
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Circuit had not addressed the issue.378 In concluding its analysis, the Court made
clear that "before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer
clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts," there must be "reasonable
suspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of
wrongdoing." 379
Although the Court held that Savana's privacy rights were violated, it also
granted the assistant principal, school nurse, and administrative assistant
qualified immunity for these claims.380 This finding was premised on divergent
lower court decisions on how the New Jersey v. T.L. 0. standard, which informs
school employees to limit a school search's intrusiveness "in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction," 381 applied to school strip
searches. 382 Consequently, the Court determined that these nonuniform judicial
views raised doubt as to whether it was clearly established that such a search
would violate the Fourth Amendment. 383 Although the Court granted qualified
immunity to the Redding school employees, it also articulated that clearly
established rights do not require that "the very action in question [has]
previously been held unlawful [because] [t]he unconstitutionality of outrageous
conduct obviously will be unconstitutional." 384
Redding has been validly criticized for its application of the TL.O.
reasonable suspicion standard to student strip searches 385 and for its qualified
immunity finding.386 Although Redding would have been much more protective
of student rights had it held that school strip searches are per se unreasonable or
so intrusive that they should require the more stringent probable cause
standard, 387 the case established a significant precedent by connecting rights-
violative student strip searches to the inappropriate and unconstitutional use of
shaming as a school disciplinary measure. Specifically, the Court found that
"[t]he meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably
feel, place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own
378Id
3 79 Redding, 557 U.S. at 377.
380 Id at 381.
381 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
3 82 See Redding, 557 U.S. at 378.
383 See id at 378-79.
384d. at 377 (citation omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999));
see also Murphy ex rel. K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990).
385 See Martin R. Gardner, Strip Searching Students: The Supreme Court's Latest
Failure To Articulate a "Sufficiently Clear" Statement ofFourth Amendment Law, 80 Miss.
L.J. 955, 956-57 (2011) (arguing Redding does not provide sufficiently clear guidance).
386 See Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 254, 300-01 (2011) (predicting Redding's qualified immunity finding will lead to more
unjustified student searches).
387 See Donahoe, supra note 205, at 1150 (arguing Redding does not go far enough to




specific suspicions." 388 So, despite Redding's palpable shortcomings, one of its
redemptive legacies has been its suggestion that courts have an "increased
willingness ... to evaluate-rather than simply assume-the impact of
investigations and punishments on students in determining whether the rights of
those students warrant restriction." 389 This suggestion has been taken up by
multiple lower courts in their § 1983 determinations that strip searches violate
students' Fourth Amendment rights and that the searching employees should not
be shielded from liability with qualified immunity. 390 This trending judicial
unwillingness to defer to school disciplinary authority when assessing student
strip searches is a positive one, 39 1 and it should deter schools and their
employees from their continued use as shaming disciplinary sanctions.
Post-Redding, there has been a growing body of case law that has
determined school strip searches can violate students' Fourth Amendment rights
and these are clearly established rights that negate the entitlement of school
officials to qualified immunity.392 This line of cases demonstrates a much
clearer establishment of students' Fourth Amendment rights when they are
forced to endure a strip search than originally expected by some of Redding's
critics,39 3 but it also demonstrates the abusive and egregious use of these
shaming punishments currently being utilized on schoolchildren. The cases
illustrate how courts will no longer defer to the disciplinary authority of the
schools when they inflict strip searches as shaming punishments needlessly in
front of the student's peers;394 when they arbitrarily impose them in
circumstances that are not based on impending danger to the school
community; 395 when they are conducted by a school employee of the opposite
sex;3 96 and when they exploit particular vulnerabilities of the student.3 97
Consequently, these are appropriate holdings that establish a clear precedent for
3 88 Redding, 557 U.S. at 377.
389 Kim, supra note 55, at 876.
390 See, e.g., Highhouse v. Wayne Highlands Sch. Dist., 205 F. Supp. 3d 639,649 (M.D.
Pa. 2016) (finding qualified immunity did not shield school actors from individual liability
for a strip search for stolen money based on Redding's clear establishment of students'
constitutional rights in this context).
39 1 See Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Constitutionality of Government-Imposed Bodily
Intrusions, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1059, 1096 (2014) (noting the Supreme Court in Redding
"tempered its deference to school officials with attentiveness to a strip search's impact on
students").
39 2 E.g., Hayward v. Salem City Bd. of Educ., No. CV 14-5200 (JBS/AMD), 2016 WL
4744132, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2016) (denying a school resource officer's motion for
summary judgment on a § 1983 failure to intervene claim where he was present along with
the male vice principal in a small office, in which a strip search that exposed the breasts of
the searched student to the searching female school employee took place).
39 3 See supra notes 385-86.
39 4 See infra text accompanying notes 398-403.
39 5 See infra text accompanying notes 404-09.
39 6 See infra text accompanying notes 410-16.
39 7 See infra text accompanying notes 417-24.
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discontinuing the use of strip searches as disciplinary methods in American
schools.
When schools and their employees inflict strip searches as shaming
punishments needlessly in front of the student's peers, they violate the students'
Fourth Amendment privacy rights. For example, in Dawson ex rel. D.H. v.
Clayton County School District, based on a suspicion of drug possession, a
twelve-year-old seventh grader, D.H., was subjected to a fully nude strip search
by the male assistant principal in the presence of the school resource officer and
three of his student peers.398 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that the searching administrator was not entitled to qualified immunity for the
violation of the student's Fourth Amendment rights.39 9 Relying on Redding's
determination that "adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness
of the exposure,"4 00 the court determined that the assistant principal's decision
to "forc[e] D.H. to strip naked in front of his peer .. . exposed D.H. to an
unnecessary level of intrusion that rendered the search excessive in scope and,
therefore, [the strip search was] unconstitutional." 40 1 Next, the court
appropriately concluded that:
[A] reasonable official in [the administrator's] position would not have
believed that requiring D.H. to strip down to his fully naked body in front of
several of his peers was lawful in light of the clearly established principle that
a student strip search, even if justified in its inception, must be "reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." 402
Consequently, the court appropriately determined that the administrator was not
entitled to qualified immunity from liability for this constitutionally violative
strip search.403
When schools and their employees arbitrarily impose shaming strip
searches in circumstances that are not based on impending danger to the school
community, they violate students' Fourth Amendment rights. For example, in
Highhouse v. Wayne Highlands School District, Ryan Highbouse, a sixteen-
year-old high school student, was forced to strip down to his underwear by his
teacher and school vice principal, who then pulled at his underwear's elastic,
exposing his anal and pubic areas, under a belief that he stole $250 from another
student during gym class.404 Heavily relying upon Redding's degradation
39 8 Dawson ex rel. D.H. v. Clayton Cty. Sch. Dist., 830 F.3d 1306, 1310-12 (11th Cir.
2016).
399Id at 1320.4 00 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009).
401 Dawson, 830 F.3d at 1318.
4 02 Id (quoting Redding, 557 U.S. at 370).




analysis of student strip searches,405 the court determined the Redding rule for
reasonable strip searches was not met.406 Specifically, it found that currency
does not pose the potential to inflict harm or damage to school community
members and that the defendants "had no reason to believe that students hide
money in their underwear." 407 Consequently, the court determined that Ryan
had sufficiently pled the basis for a Fourth Amendment violation due to the strip
search and denied the motion to dismiss on this claim. 408 The court also
determined the school employees were not entitled to qualified immunity
because Redding clearly established the "legal contours" of strip searches prior
to the search. 409
When schools and their employees conduct strip searches where a school
employee searches a student of the opposite sex, this has also been deemed to
violate the student's Fourth Amendment privacy rights. In Hotchkiss ex rel. J T
v. Garno, J.T., the only African-American student at his middle school, alleged
that his female principal strip searched him by having him take his pants down
to expose his underwear once in sixth grade in a private office in search of a
laser pointer and again in seventh grade in the communal teachers' lounge in
search of a music player.410 In denying the principal's motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity, the court determined that J.T.'s
allegations constituted a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, emphasizing
that students do not abandon legitimate expectations of privacy at the school
door and are not to be treated as prisoners for Fourth Amendment analysis even
in the context of the "schools are different" ideology.41 1 The court identified the
significant privacy interest that students have in their unclothed bodies and
found that the strip search by an adult woman offended J.T.'s reasonable
expectation of privacy. 412
From there, the court determined that this right was clearly established
based on an application of a pre-Redding Sixth Circuit decision that had
analogously stated almost thirty years prior: "[i]t does not require a
constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a thirteen-year-old child
is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude. More than that: it is a
violation of any known principle of human decency." 4 13 That the strip search
was to the underwear, rather than completely nude, did not affect the court's








413Id at 733 (quoting Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 983 (6th Cir. 1984)).
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conclusion. 4 14 The court determined there would be no doubt in the mind of a
reasonable government official that the conduct was objectively unreasonable
in the light of clearly established constitutional rights.4 15 Consequently, the
court concluded that "[a] female school administrator who forces a male middle
school student to disrobe to his underwear to search for a stolen music player or
laser pointer is not entitled to qualified immunity." 4 16
Finally, when schools and their employees exploit known privacy
vulnerabilities of the student through shaming strip searches, they violate the
student's Fourth Amendment rights. According to the complaint in Gray v.
Great Valley School District, Marykate Gray, a sixteen-year-old eleventh
grader, had been assaulted and harassed by students and school staff members,
which resulted in a no-contact agreement between the school social worker and
Marykate. 4 17 After being observed taking an ibuprofen by a teacher, Marykate
was removed from class and taken to the assistant principal's office where the
social worker confronted her about drug possession.4 18 After a search of her
backpack yielded no contraband, Marykate was aggressively patted down by the
social worker.4 19 Then, Marykate was taken to the school nurse's office, where
the school social worker strip searched her and fondled her breasts during the
search under her bra, within view of the assistant principal and within the
presence of the nurse. 42 0 No contraband was found.42 1 In evaluating the
constitutionality of the search, the court found that Marykate was subjected to
an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 422
Further, the court concluded that the social worker was not entitled to
qualified immunity as students' rights in the context of strip searches were
clearly established by Redding, which was decided two years before the alleged
strip search.42 3 It specifically found that Redding:
was sufficient to put a reasonable school official such as Trimble on notice that
strip searching plaintiff-despite knowledge of her emotional vulnerabilities,
despite knowledge of the no-contact agreement, without the prior approval of
her parents, and without any "distinct elements ofjustification" to believe that
she was hiding contraband underneath her clothing-violated plaintiff's
4 14 See id ("Although this case does not involve a nude search, but rather an alleged
order by a female administrator to a middle school male student to strip to his underwear, if
true the alleged conduct 'would obviously violate [the Fourth Amendment]."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Lewis ex rel. Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d
1316, 1320 (7th Cir. 1993))).
415Id. at 734.
4 16 Hotchkiss, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 734-35.






423 Gray, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 686.
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clearly established right to be free from an unreasonable strip search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 424
These cases demonstrate the growing number of courts that will no longer
defer to schools' disciplinary authority with regard to strip searches. By denying
individuals qualified immunity and relying on Redding to do so, these cases are
establishing a precedent that students have a clearly established constitutional
right to be free from overly intrusive shaming strip searches. To supplement this
point, there have been post-Redding case decisions which evaluate pre-Redding
strip searches that premise their grants of qualified immunity on the basis that
Redding had not yet clearly established the students' rights. 4 25 This implies that
future grants of qualified immunity will not be as readily obtained.
Although there have been a few post-Redding strip search cases that have
determined the Monell requirements for municipal liability have not been
met,42 6 other courts have taken a more expansive view in fmding that school
entities can have municipal liability for school strip searches.42 7 These
expansive views of municipal liability for student strip searches include the
recognition that a failure to train could be a Monell policy, and the adoption of
the Pembaur approach, which provides that the acts of a government official
with final policymaking authority satisfy the requirements for municipal
liability.42 8
As to the first approach, in Highhouse the court did not grant the school
district's motion to dismiss based on the Monell municipal liability
424 Id
42 5 Eg., Wybrow ex rel. V.W. v. DaVinci Acad. of Sci. & the Arts, No. 1:09-CV-
127 TS, 2011 WL 4001150, at *6 (D. Utah Sept. 8, 2011) (noting the constitutional rights in
a student strip search were not clearly established because the search occurred prior to
Redding); S.J. ex rel. S.J. v. Perspectives Charter Sch., 685 F. Supp. 2d 847, 854 (N.D. Ill.
2010) (granting school employees qualified immunity on a claim arising from a pre-Redding
strip search because the law regarding school strip searches was not clearly established until
Redding).
4 26 E.g, Littell v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 213 F. Supp. 3d 849, 857-58 (S.D. Tex. 2016)
(finding student plaintiffs who had allegedly been strip searched by the school nurse had not
sufficiently alleged a Monell policy or custom to support the school district's municipal
liability); Hayward v. Salem City Bd. of Educ., No. CV 14-5200 (JBS/AMD), 2016 WL
4744132, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2016) (finding the city could not be held liable for the strip
search of a high school student, allegedly conducted within the presence of a city police
officer serving as a school resource officer, because the plaintiff could not produce evidence
of an official policy or custom authorizing such a search); Hotchkiss ex rel. J.T. v. Garno,
883 F. Supp. 2d 719, 721-22, 737 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (granting school district's motion for
summary judgment based on no Monell municipal liability for two alleged strip searches of
a student by a principal when the school district policy stated that "[u]nder no circumstances
will school staff conduct or be party to a strip-search").42 7 See infra text accompanying notes 429-35.42 8 See infra text accompanying notes 429-35; see also supra text accompanying note
221 (discussing Pembaur).
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requirements. 42 9 Specifically, the court found the plaintiff had sufficiently
alleged a failure to train policy was the causation behind the constitutional
injury, as it was alleged that the school district had failed to train its employees
on the proper use of searches as part of its disciplinary authority, had failed to
train its employees on policies for searches, and had failed to properly discipline
employees who were aware of and participated in the constitutional rights
violations of students.43 0 These allegations were enough for the court to
determine there could be municipal liability for the school district.43 1
As to the second approach, in Marino ex rel. A.M v. Chester Union Free
School District, the court utilized Pembaur to arrive at an expansive view of
Monell municipal liability in a § 1983 action, in which two middle school
students, thirteen-year-old A.M. and fourteen-year-old E.J., were allegedly strip
searched by the principal and by the school nurse prior to the Redding
decision.432 The court denied the school district's motion for summary judgment
that claimed no municipal liability.433 It used Pembaur to find the principal was
a Monell municipal official vested with final policymaking authority on the
daily operations of the school because "while broad rulemaking authority is
vested in the school board by law, policymaking authority may not be so strictly
limited."4 34 Next, it found that the strip searches could plausibly represent
school policy, because there was no adopted school board policy on student
searches, leaving policy determinations to the principal who had fashioned his
own policy based on airport security protocol, which his subordinates were
instructed to follow. 435
Although Redding failed to provide comprehensive protections for students'
Fourth Amendment rights, 4 36 it did establish an important precedent by linking
rights-violative student strip searches to the inappropriate and unconstitutional
use of shaming as a school disciplinary measure. Further, although the "schools
are different" ideology is typically student rights restrictive,43 7 as it has often
been employed by courts to determine student constitutional rights have not
429 See Highhouse v. Wayne Highlands Sch. Dist., 205 F. Supp. 3d 639, 649-50 (M.D.
Pa. 2016).
431d




43 5 Id at 570.
43 6 Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding's Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth
Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 Miss. L.J. 847, 953 (2011)
(arguing Redding failed to provide sufficient protections for students' privacy rights).
43 7 See Raul R. Calvoz et al., Cyber Bullying and Free Speech: Striking an Age-
Appropriate Balance, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 357, 379 (2013) (outlining this ideology); Ronald
T. Hyman, Constitutional Issues When Testing Students for Drug Use, A Special Exception,
and Telltale Metaphors, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 10 (2006) (discussing the rights-restrictive nature
of the ideology).
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been violated but would have been if exercised by adults in other contexts, 438
Redding's subtle spin on this ideology may actually prove beneficial to the
future preservation of students' Fourth Amendment rights in the context of
shaming school strip searches. 439 By focusing on the inherent differences
between adults and children in its determination that Savana's privacy
expectation was reasonable through comparing it to the consistent experiences
of other similarly searched schoolchildren, whose "adolescent vulnerability
intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure,"44 0 the Court linked
shaming punishments in the context of strip searches of children to
constitutional violations.441 Although there have been some post-Redding strip
search cases that have granted qualified immunity for the searching school
officials,44 2 the correct constitutional approach has been in those cases that
found inapposite based on this shaming link articulated in Redding.443
This link has become a central analytical aspect of the growing body of§ 1983 case law that has determined strip searches violate students' Fourth
Amendment rights and searching officials are not protected by qualified
immunity for these shaming sanctions. This line of case law that clearly
establishes students' Fourth Amendment rights in the context of invasive strip
searches, even as circumscribed as these rights are in schools,4 4 should deter
schools and their employees from their use. Awareness of the potential liability
that incurs from school strip searches and of their rights-violative nature should
438 Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amendments, 12 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 971, 1039-40 (2010) (showing how the "schools are different" ideology has
been used to find that public school students have more limited speech rights than adults
outside of schools); Matthew Lynch, Note, Mere Platitudes: The "Domino Effect" of School-
Search Cases on the Fourth Amendment Rights of Every American, 91 IOWA L. REv. 781,
807 (2006) (noting how the Supreme Court has employed this ideology in its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to determine that public school students have more limited
privacy rights than adults outside of schools).
4 39 See Katz & Mazzone, supra note 51, at 382 (identifying an important contribution of
Redding as the Court's clarity that student strip searches are extraordinary intrusions that
should be employed only in extreme circumstances).
4 40 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009).
441 See Chiang, supra note 136, at 636 (discussing the Court's acknowledgment of the
inherent difference between searching adults and students as a central basis for finding the
strip search unconstitutional).
44 2 See, e.g., Sandidge ex rel. S.S. v. Turner Unified Sch. Dist. # 202, No. 12-CV-02346-
CM, 2012 WL 6561525, at *4 (D. Kan. Dec. 14, 2012) (granting the individual defendant
qualified immunity for a school strip search because Redding did not "clearly establish[] that
a student-informant's tip that she had seen plaintiff put marijuana or marijuana paraphernalia
in her bra earlier that day [was] insufficient to warrant reasonable suspicion to search
plaintiff's bra").
4 3 See supra text accompanying notes 431-37.
4 Mitchell, supra note 26, at 296 ("[S]tudents do not enjoy the full panoply of the
constitution's protections . . . .").
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motivate schools, teachers, and administrators to no longer impose them as the
inherently shaming punishments they are.445
C. A Conclusion on the Constitutional Critique ofSchool Shaming
Punishments
Even though the Supreme Court and federal courts have engaged in a
"modem trend of wide deference to the educators' interest in controlling the
school environment," 446 which has given rise to one view that judicial "odes to
the rights of ... students are illusory platitudes,"447 there are actually limits to
such deference when school discipline becomes an abuse of authority.448 The
imposition of school shaming punishments, like compelled apologies and strip
searches, has the significant potential to extend beyond those deferential limits
and to result in liability for both schools and their actors for violations of
students' First and Fourth Amendment rights. Consequently, these cases should
serve as precedent for schools, teachers, and administrators to end the use of
shaming punishments to avoid liability and to ensure they are not violating the
constitutional rights of their students. There is hope for the preservation of
students' speech and privacy rights through the abolition of these shaming
sanctions in American schools.449
IV. CONCLUSION
The time has come to end shaming punishments in schools. "The
schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the power
of government.... The values they learn there, they take with them in life." 450
The values that are being taught via school shaming punishments to the
punished student and the school community are purely retributive, immensely
44 5 See Donahoe, supra note 205, at 1169 (discussing how schools should educate their
employees about the rights-violative nature of strip searches to promote a safe learning
environment).
446 Bernard James & Joanne E.K. Larson, The Doctrine of Deference: Shifting
Constitutional Presumptions and the Supreme Court's Restatement of Student Rights After
Board of Education v. Earls, 56 S.C. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004).
4 4 Scott A. Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factjinding: When Minimalism and Judicial
Modesty Go Too Far, 32 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 549, 559 (2009).
448See James & Larson, supra note 446, at 90 ("The Earls model of deference
effectively limits the judicial function to watching for evidence of anomaly and abuse of
authority . . . .").
449 See James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation
Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1641 (1990) ("We need not be totally despondent,
however, for if we had to choose a single sphere of political concern in which to accomplish
the most political reform by applying a thoroughly reconstructive remedy, education almost
certainly would be that sphere.").
450 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385-86 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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harmful, and potentially debilitating,451 like those imposed by exclusionary and
corporal punishments. 452 These are not the norms schoolchildren should be
internalizing, 453 and their inefficacy and harm provide an independent basis for
the cessation of shaming punishments in schools. 454
If this inefficacy and harm analysis does not provide enough persuasion for
schools, teachers, and administrators to abandon shaming punishments, the
specter of liability for their imposition should do so.455 Student rights in schools
are certainly circumscribed. 456 Schools and their actors are given considerable
deference in disciplinary authority by courts.457 However, there is a limit to this
authority, and this limit can be breached by constitutional-rights-violative
school shaming punishments. These punishments can and should give rise to
monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief when schools and their actors
violate students' First or Fourth Amendment rights.458 Awareness of the
constitutional violations and potential liability that result from school shaming
punishments should provide additional sway to educators to no longer inflict
them.459
451 See Alec Walen, A Punitive Precondition for Preventive Detention: Lost Status as a
Foundation for a Lost Immunity, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1229, 1262 (2011) (labeling shaming
punishments as retributive, "needlessly cruel[,] and counterproductive").
4 52 See Susan H. Bitensky, Section 1983: Agent ofPeace or Vehicle of Violence Against
Children?, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 363-65 (2001) (discussing the extensive harms of child
corporal punishments); Feld, supra note 436, at 892-94 (discussing the myriad harms of
school exclusionary punishments).
4 53 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 20 (2007) (discussing the signaling
nature of an individual who presently obeys social norms that he or she will be a cooperative
participant in future social interactions as these norms are fundamentally self-beneficial).4 5
, See Anita L. Allen, Lecture, Privacy Isn't Everything: Accountability as a Personal
and Social Good, 54 ALA. L. REv. 1375, 1385 (2003) ("People who harm children should be
accountable for the wrong they do.").45 5 1ngraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 678 (1977) (finding school authorities will not
likely inflict unnecessary or excessive punishment when they might be sued for it).
456 See, e.g., Homer H. Clark, Jr., David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Children and the
Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 31 (1992) (discussing the irony that, despite the
Supreme Court's rhetoric, it has done little to recognize schoolchildren's constitutional
rights).
457 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985) (finding the
preservation of order and discipline in the school environment justifies the circumscription
of schoolchildren's constitutional rights).
45 8 See supra Part I1I.B.2-3.
459 See Karlan, supra note 206, at 1914 ("[Tlhe overarching purpose of constitutional
law is to deter or prevent deprivations of individuals' rights, and not simply to induce the
government to internalize their costs or to compensate individuals who suffer them after the
fact.").
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So, what, then, would be a preferred method of school discipline? 460 An
extended recommendation of such an alternative is beyond the scope of this
Article, given the "intractable puzzle of what method ... might be the best
means." 461 However, a focal point for this emerging dialogue should be that
"environments can be altered notjust to stop conduct, but also to facilitate better
decision-making." 462 As schools abandon shaming, they should adopt
alternative measures to shape student behavior in positive, rather than
stigmatizing, ways, 463 like positive behavioral interventions and supports, 464
that are sensitive to and aware of the developmental maturity and self-identity
of children. 465
Although the dialogue should be open as to better alternatives, the question of
whether schools should utilize shaming penalties should be closed. These
punishments harm individual students and create broader negative collateral
consequences. These punishments can violate students' constitutional rights and
expose schools to liability. Consequently, shaming punishments should be
eliminated as disciplinary measures in K-12 schools. "Schools cannot expect
their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship when the school authorities
themselves disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our
constitutional freedoms." 466  Therefore, school entities and actors,
schoolchildren, and school communities must no longer play the
unconstitutional roles required in the degradation ceremonies that are inherent
in shaming punishments.
460 This preference in discipline is an important consideration that merits further
discussion. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 453, at 18 (arguing that reform of a
punishment system is an arduous process).
461 Massaro, supra note 119, at 649.
462 Ryan Calo, Essay, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REv. 773, 798 (2014).
463 See Jason P. Nance, Over-Disciplining Students, Racial Bias, and the School-to-
Prison Pipeline, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1063, 1070 (2016) ("Schools must also
replace ... harsh disciplinary measures with evidence-based practices that create safe,
positive learning climates.").
464 See Brown, supra note 36, at 950 (arguing school discipline can only be positively
reformed through a comprehensive approach that includes revision of harmful policies,
increasing disciplinary education, and systematic data collection to isolate and identify
persistent inequities).
465 See id. at 965-71 (advocating for reform of disciplinary practices in schools to
implement constitutional alternatives that are developmentally appropriate for children);
Janel A. George, Stereotype and School Pushout: Race, Gender, and Discipline Disparities,
68 AlK. L. REv. 101, 127 (2015) (discussing school disciplinary alternatives that are
"gender-responsive, trauma-sensitive, and culturally competent").
4 66 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027-28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
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